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Abstract
The research question that this thesis seeks to answer is: in what ways do liberation
movements impact a nation’s experience with democratic consolidation after conflict ends?
When the rebel organization is relatively weaker than the state, the state can control their actions.
The liberation movement will not be able to manipulate the state, but will be able to impose costs
on status quo maintenance. This will then lead the two parties to form a democratic pact and
negotiate, resulting in the organization’s increased preference for democratic methods in the
future. However, when the liberation movement and the state have relatively equal strength, the
organization will be able to impose its will on the state and drastically increase the costs the
government incurs to maintain the status quo. This will then lead the state to quickly end the
conflict through negotiations where the liberation movement will be able to manipulate the
government into conceding to their terms. The fact that the organization achieved its outcome
goals through the use of violence will cement those methods once the organization becomes and
institutionalized political party. This theory is tested using a comparative case study of the wars
for liberation in South Africa and Zimbabwe. In the case of the ANC in South Africa, the
liberation movement was largely controlled by the state, but the organization was still able to
impose costs for status quo maintenance. This then resulted in the government’s desire to end the
conflict while still in a position of authority. This necessitated the ANC to utilize diplomatic and
democratic methods to achieve power. In the war for liberation in Zimbabwe, ZANU/ZAPU
forces were able to affect the stability of the nation that resulted in the government’s decision to
concede to the terms of the group. This allowed the organization become an institutionalized
political party that consolidated authority once in power.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The path nations take and how they transform from what they were, to what they are now
are the result of a multitude of variables. The way in which a nation develops over time is
informed by their story and what political leaders have done to arrive at a position of authority
within the state; the history and journey of a nation matters. Two nations that share strikingly
similar histories can develop radically different political institutions as the result of a singular
difference. Essentially, the slightest bit of deviation between the two can send the states on a
remarkably different course where one can become a beacon of democratic light on the African
continent, while the other can fall into deep-seeded authoritarian rule. The cases that epitomize
this vast demarcation is that of South Africa and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia).
During the middle of the 20th century, the nations of Rhodesia and South Africa shared
exceptionally similar characteristics. Both of these nations were administered by settler regimes
that employed oppressive elite-white minority rule over the black populace and sought to restrict
their liberties at nearly every turn. These prohibitive policies enforced by the regimes were part
of the blatantly racist governing structures that attempted to regulate the lives of the black
inhabitants in accordance with a flawed vision of the natural order of the world. In both of these
nations, liberation movements rose to oppose these efforts of the settler regime; answering the
demanding calls for black power and nationalism.
The wars for liberation within South Africa and Zimbabwe shared as many qualities with
one another as their settler regimes did. For in these two states, both black nationalist groups
committed radical acts of violence against the state, as well as the unarmed citizenry.
Additionally, both sought to remove the same type of governance from the territory: elite-white
minority rule. Each group completed the war for liberation with broad swath of the citizenry
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supporting their actions, which demonstrates that these rebellions were not committed by a
radical few, but by the many. Lastly, both liberation movements were aided by foreign actors in
their efforts to remove the imposed government. This includes international organizations such
as the United Nations and far away, countries like China, in addition to regional neighbors such
as Mozambique and Tanzania.
While the settler regimes and the liberation movements share many of the same qualities,
South Africa and Zimbabwe could not have went down more different paths in the decades
following their war for liberation. After the conflict in South Africa, the ANC led by Nelson
Mandela fostered democratic consolidation by inviting multiple parties to join the political
system and vie for office through free and fair elections. Contrastingly, the ZANU-PF headed by
Robert Mugabe consolidated authority at nearly every opportunity. Whether it was coercing the
populace into supporting the organization or embarking on campaigns to rid of any form of
opposition, the government successfully cemented itself as the dominating actor of Zimbabwe.
Given this puzzle, I formulate my research question:
In what ways do liberation movements impact a nation’s experience with democratic
consolidation after conflicts end?
Although the wars for liberation bear extraordinarily similar qualities, there is a
component of the struggles that did differ between them: the relative power dynamic between the
rebels and the state. I argue that this discrepancy between the cases accounts for the divergence
of the two nations after the war ended. I conduct a comparative case study on South Africa and
Zimbabwe to evaluate my theory that it is this relative power dynamic that accounts for the
deviant outcomes: the absence or presence of democratic consolidation. Through the analysis of
each of their wars for liberation, the qualities of each of the struggles will become known and I
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will be able to determine if my theory explains the vast demarcation of political development in
South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Through my assessment of the relevant literature, I find that while ZANU was able to
inflict mass casualties on the state troops and conquer large areas of territory within Rhodesia,
the actions and cadres of the ANC could be definitively controlled by the South African regime.
This resulted in the ability for ZANU to manipulate and pressure the Rhodesian government in
ways in which that the ANC could not for the South African regimes. These wholly different
capacities of the liberation movements to affect change within their distinct nations has great
implications for how the war for liberation would come to an end, along with how that party will
operate in the future. It is this component of the organization that can explain why a dictatorship
and democracy developed within these two states.
This thesis is organized into five distinct sections. The first section is the introduction and
contains the puzzle I am attempting to solve along with my research question, general research
design, and an overview of the theory. The second section explores the relevant literature
surrounding democratization and development. The third section contains the theory that seeks to
explain how relative power dynamics shape the future of political development within a specific
context. The fourth section details the stories of the two distinct wars for liberation in South
Africa and Zimbabwe. The fifth and final section contains a reiteration of the hypothesis and
theory, how the findings of the study contribute to the relevant literature, and the general
limitations of the project.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
During the last three decades of the 20th century, many African nations experienced a
rapid period of political change. Within this time, dozens of countries transitioned from
governments that imposed oppressive authoritarian rule, to ones with free and fair elections
(Gibson 2002: 202). This intense fervor of democratization has prompted the attention of
academics who have sought to explain the causal factors that motivated the political change.
However, explaining political change in Africa has proven to be a difficult task due to the sheer
size of the continent. The large number of countries in Africa creates a great amount of variation
for academics to account for while researching the topic. The diversity of democratization from
case to case is not conducive to the creation of general explanatory theory (Geddes 1999:117).
For this reason, it is difficult to research African political change in sweeping ways without
sacrificing crucial accuracy. Although this circumstance might cast a dim forecast for research
on political change, there are common themes that have been promoted by many.

Democracy and Development
A central tenant of democratization literature is the relationship studied between the
prevalence of democratic structures and economic development. Within this literature, the
economic crisis of the 1980s has been cited as the developmental ignitor that has had profound
consequences for the modernization of political institutions during the following decade (Gibson
2002: 203). However, there is vehement disagreement concerning the precise mechanisms at
play. Exactly how these two domains are related and how struggling financial institutions
influence the political landscape has been one of the key questions tackled by scholars.
Modernization theory has been conventionalized among academics of African
democratization. Lipset (1959) is the pioneering voice in the articulation of this theory that
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describes the evolution of society and what that development can insinuate for the prospects of
democratization. This line of teaching alleges that as society develops both economically and
socially, the populace becomes more dependent on cooperation within the nation. This increase
in the complexity of civil arrangements will demand a type of rule where the people are not
commanded and co-opted into certain political organizations. Essentially, as the producers within
the nation demand a degree of autonomy to complete their objectives for the rest of society,
autocratic rulers will be forced to soften their grip on the nonstate entity. According to
modernization theory, society has developed to such an extent that the overarching hand of an
authoritarian regime can no longer contain them. This finding by Lipset (1959) proved as the
roots from which future research would grow and develop.
Diamond & Linz (1989) built on this relationship and found that poor allocation and
management of financial resources by the government created unstable grounds for democracies
to be based upon. These authors found that when there is pervasive discontent among the
populace in democratic states, incumbents are less likely to retain their positions. Due to this
precariousness, elected politicians were less likely to maintain authority. When the legitimate
wielders of power were thrusted from their seats by the votes of the citizenry, opportunityseeking authoritarians would swoop in to fill their vacated positions. Therefore, when the
citizenry and businesses’ within a democracy are experiencing economic hardship because of
governmental mismanagement of the financial industry, this in turn creates vulnerable
democratic processes.
Londregan & Poole (1990) concur with previous findings concerning the specific
relationship between democracy and development; that poverty within the citizenry is a
definitive precursor of authoritarian overthrow. According to the authors, this backwards
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transition can occur in nations that have democratic rule, along with nations that currently
embody a different type of authoritarian government. In either scenario, widespread discontent
among the population brought on by poverty can result in democratic backsliding. This led
Londregan & Poole (1990) to the conclusion that although the undertaking of a democratic
transition is difficult, nations that have functioning economic institutions are the ones that
generally succeed in the implementation of democratic rule.
The findings of the aforementioned researchers Diamond & Linz (1989) and Londregan
& Poole (1990) bolster one another in what they provide concerning the effect that a nation’s
handling of financial resources along with the well-being of the citizenry has on the process of
democratization. However, this line of theory was given even more detail by Przeworski and
Limongi (1997) who sought to put much of the conventional democratization theory to test.
Their method of analysis was to study the relationship between the GDP per capita of a given
nation’s citizenry and their political institutions.
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) review the explanation of Lipset (1959) that economic
development is a catalyst for democratization. These authors find that the materialization of
democracy is not necessarily a derivative of economic growth (Przeworski & Limongi 1997:
177). Through their analysis on political institutions from across the globe, the researchers
conclude that democratization can be incited at stages of development all along the spectrum.
However, they do find a certain level of GDP per capita where nations that have undertaken a
democratic transition are unlikely to experience backsliding. In addition to this finding,
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) contend that the relationship exists because it is unlikely that
authoritarians will be able to secure power in a more developed country. This argument departs
from the early teachings of modernization theory in the sense that it analyzes the dynamic in the
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opposing manner. Instead of explaining how economic development can help increase the
literacy of the populace, which would them make them stronger citizens (Lipset 1959),
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) assert that when the nation’s businesses have seen success
because of a more liberal government and the populace is more content, they will be less likely
to be co-opted by authoritarian rule. This is merely one component of democratization research,
but it demonstrates the types of differing approaches within this field of study.

Government Structure
Democratization research is a study based on political movement; how the institutions
within a nation change and develop from their current shape into a different form. When
analyzing this transitory path, attention must be paid to the current political system which
governs the nation. It is this institution and those who are governed by its mandates that have
implications for that country’s democratization process. The study of democratic countries can
be relatively encompassing; what is found about one democracy is likely to be relatable to all
because the systems have similar mechanisms within them to ensure that public opinion has
bearing on those who enjoy power and authority (Geddes 1999:121). Such a mechanism are
elections where the officials are held accountable through the ballot box. These types of
processes where the people are by law included in the political structure and government
operation is largely absent in non-democratic forms of rule.
A generalization that causes many to neglect some of the key features of governmental
bodies is the authoritarian label. By merely attaching this definition to a particular government,
one is not informed on the actual characteristics of the regime and the distribution of power
within them. Authoritarian regimes differ from one another as much as they do from
democracies (Geddes 1999:121). How these governments hire their employees, the formal and
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informal laws surrounding the leadership selection process and the manner in which the
government reacts to calls from the people are all components of an authoritarian government
that greatly influence the political landscape. Therefore, there is immense diversity among this
form of governance.
Because no two authoritarian regimes command their nation in the same way, attention
must be paid to the specific way in which that government maintains authority. These regimes
can be categorized based on their type. Geddes (1999) places authoritarian regimes into three
distinct segments: personalist, single-party, and military. These three regime types respond to
various situations in different ways; whether the decisions of a nation are mandated by a group of
military officers, a powerful individual, or a dominating single-party. By analyzing the specific
way the authoritarian regimes are able to maintain their authority and control over the functions
of the state, Geddes is able to provide important distinctions concerning the mechanisms they
utilize over the governing structure.
Through this discerning lens, many scholars of African democratization have analyzed
how these regime types operate. Bratton & van de Walle (1997) have focused on the ways in
which rulers operating within a single party regime enjoy high amounts of discretion over the
creation of policy. It is in these regimes where the ruling elite can be heavily insulated from the
wants of the citizenry (Bratton & van de Walle 1997:61-96). In these regimes, the single party
has the sole power to provide high-ranking officials, private businesspersons, and the citizenry
with carrots or sticks to influence their behavior.
To this point, Geddes articulates a slightly differing rationale in her explanation of this
type of stability. In reference to the actions of officials within single party regimes, Geddes
asserts, “Like democratic politicians, they simply want to hold office. Some value office because
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they want to control policy, some for the pure enjoyment of influence, and power, and some for
the illicit material gains that come with office in some countries”(Geddes 1999:129). With this
take, the stability that is described by Bratton & van de Walle (1997) is not refuted, but built
upon. Not only do many within the population owe their lives to members of this elite group and
remain loyal to them, but the status of the high-ranking officials is ensured by their fulfillment
of duties for certain segments of the populace. This mutually dependent relationship often results
in a highly embedded leadership structure where political transition becomes difficult to
facilitate.
Unfortunately, this exchange of loyalty for resources between the regime and certain
citizens is excluding. While the clientelist system can greatly benefit those who are lucky enough
to be a part of the arrangement, it is very difficult for the rest of the populace to become a player
in the game. With little to offer those in power, the calls from the lower classes often are ignored.
Essentially, this segment of the populace bears the highest cost in the form of unrepresentative
government, with none of the benefit. It is this characteristic of the single party regime that can
create instability.
Geddes (1999) finds that the regime is secure when it can achieve the wants and needs of
the public; however, it becomes a different case when the government can no longer provide for
the people. In these cases where widespread discontent among the regime’s clients as well as the
excluded classes, they have been able to impose great costs on the government for maintaining
the status quo. Huntington (1995) found that although these leaders might enjoy great authority
over the creation of policy, their position of power is dependent on their ability to provide for
those who allow them to enjoy power: their loyalists. If there are occurrences within the nation
that prevent the leader from awarding supporters, the underpinnings of the ruling elite are
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shaken. Within nations that have leaders waiting to usurp authority, this weakness of the regime
has set the stage for a coup.
The arguments of Bratton & van de Walle (1997) and Huntington (1995) lead to one of
the core disagreements among African democratization scholars: where the pressures that force
democratization stem from. Scholars have placed the epicenter of the wave of democratization
within the purview of political activity occurring outside of the formalized government.
According to some researchers, it has been the rising up of the citizenry that has forced political
liberalization.

Agency of Civil Society
Actors functioning within oppressive regimes have demonstrated an ability to affect
change within the state. A case that depicts this capacity for civil society to generate political
reform occurred in Zambia during the later part of the 20th century. Kenneth Kuanda was one of
the longest serving state leaders throughout the continent; ruthlessly presiding over the territory
for nearly 30 years (Good 1987: 511). While Kuanda was in power, he commanded the one-party
state and stripped the populace of essential rights and liberties. In response to these authoritarian
and oppressive conditions, actors bound together and created the Zambia Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU). This coalition of laborers and citizens placed great pressure upon Kuanda and
the United Independence Party (UNIP) and eventually forced elections where the organization
was forced out of power.
Debates among scholars concerning democratization are based in differing conceptions of
the agency of civil society which is defined as the total some of political activity committed by
nonstate actors (Bratton 1994: 56). Therefore, any political activity which occurs everywhere
from outside of the nuclear family all the way to the formal state is considered to be the actions
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of civil society (Gibson 2002:212). While most African democratization scholars agree that this
segment of the populace has played a crucial role in fostering democratization, the extent of this
impact has faced much contention. A powerful voice on this topic has been the work of Bratton
& van de Walle (1997). These scholars have promoted the idea that the African political
development of the latter half of the 20th century was incited by the lower classes of civil society.
Scholars who support this view suggest that civil society is responsible for the creation
and continuation of norms for how ‘politics’ is done within a nation. Civil society is the group
responsible for holding those in power accountable to their actions; this part of the populace is
essential for the energy behind general political reform (Diamond 1996). In reference to the
findings of Bratton & van de Walle, Gibson (2002) states that the authors, “…[A]rgue for an
account of African political change based on domestic rather than international phenomena,
including civil society and a country’s particular political and electoral institutions”(204). With
this line of theory, civil society is regarded as the most basic component needed to ignite and
keep burning the fire of African democratization, not pressures placed on nations to democratize
by international actors.
Through intense political protest and displays of opposition, civil society can advocate
for the changes they seek to promote. When those in civil society can organize themselves and
agree on the means to achieve their end, Bratton & van de Walle argue that the populace can
affect immense change within the political system (1997:83). In their view, the leaders within a
nation are rational and constantly partake in cost/benefit analysis. Largely, if these rulers are able
to maintain authority through relative ease and gain from the status quo, these politicians would
see little need to alter their strategy. Nevertheless, if those in civil society can raise the costs of
maintaining the status quo for those in power to a point where governing no longer makes sense,
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politicians will reform the system for their own gain. Bratton and van de Walle view civil society
as the segment that can tip the balance in favor of democratization and increase the costs that the
ruling elite face (1997). However, some have doubted not only the ability of civil society, but
also their desire to remove authoritarian systems.
Mamdani is a scholar that has been pessimistic about the capability of civil society to
foster immense political change. He asserts that due to European colonialization, many African
nations were the subject of mass extraction and manipulation, not the creation of strong political
institutions (1996). The imposed order centralized the state’s political activity within the urban
area; those who lived in the outer countryside simply were not able to engage with their
government. Therefore, the colonial regimes only needed to secure their dominating position in
one central location as opposed to having to secure the entirety of the nation (Mamdani 1996).
From this conceptualization of the European colonizer’s actions, Mamdani draws a bleak
picture for Africans to take on the roles of “citizen”. The author justifies this claim by asserting
that the populations within these colonized nations were divided into two distinct segments.
While those who lived in the urban centers were able to influence politics, those in rural areas
were shut out of the process. With this view, Mamdani argues that without substantial changes
such as increased access to civil education and a general increase in living standards, the
prospects for civil society within Africa is dim (1996). If this segment of the populace is divided,
they will ultimately be too weak and inhibited from motivating democratization (Mamdani
1996).
Not only does this systematic explanation for the prospects of civil society create a
dismal picture for democratization, but Foley and Edwards (1996) offer a more basic contention
rooted in the wants of the citizenry. These scholars argue that even if civil society did have the
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capacity to alter the political landscape, why should scholars assume that the people would
pursue democratic rule? While many in civil society are made worse off because of single party
clientelist rule, there also many powerful actors within the state that greatly benefit from the
system. The interests of these actors are not compatible with the pursuance of democratic rule. In
their work, Foley and Edwards (1996) go on to assert that even if civil society was powerful
enough to remove an authoritarian government from power, who is to say that they would not
seek to overthrow a democracy once it was established? Essentially, these authors argue that
much of the literature praising the role of civil society is more so based on “…[W]ishful thinking
than rigorous analysis” (Gibson 2002:213).

International Factors
While democratization’s key features are most clearly present at the domestic level, the
current state of the international community has a bearing on how these nations develop
(Remmer 1995: 106). This being the case, a multitude of factors influence action within states
based on how that particular country is linked to the international system. Therefore, as Stallings
(1992) notes, each state will respond differently to the same global stimuli, leading to the largely
agreed upon assertion that the situations inside of a nation must be given proper consideration
before attempting to determine how foreign bodies affect the state. While scholars recognize this
limitation, they have nevertheless persisted in their efforts to study the relationship between
international pressure and democratization.
Scholars have cited the numerous ways in which international factors foster democratic
consolidation within a specific context. Karl & Schmitter (1991) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens,
and Stephens (1992) both articulate the mechanisms in which international groups can influence
politics within the domestic context. Mainly, the authors focus on economic and psychological
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routes, but all the scholars understand their rationale is related to a singular case. Essentially, the
researchers recognize the difficulties of asserting a general theory of the international factors
involved in democratization. In order to combat this problem, researches have begun to
recognize the value of analyzing development case studies from a more encompassing view.
Through taking a step back, scholars have sought to find the commonalties and consensuses of
the cases that have transitioned towards democracy.
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) have analyzed how a nations interaction
with international financial institutions factor into democratic development. These scholars find
that when a nation has developed economic ties with foreign capitalist nations, the country
becomes more likely to democratize, “There is no doubt that rapid economic growth, or a
growing economic pie, facilitates compromise between capital and labor…” (Renner 1992: 112).
When this is the case, the economic ties a nation has with the international community can prove
to be extremely influential for that nation’s development. This movement stems from the overall
increase in wealth throughout the population while also shifting the balance of power within the
state from the ruling-elite, to the rest of the citizenry (Renner 1995: 108). Admittedly this is a
domestic pressure which promotes democratization, but it is rooted in trade with wealthy
international actors. A large component of a nation’s experience in the international arena is
economically based. When a state interacts with the global marketplace, they have the ability to
accumulate wealth at all levels of the social hierarchy; from the ruling elite to the unskilled
laborer, all of the citizenry can benefit. Precisely how a nation handles this aspect of governance
and whether or not they are allowing the people to see the fruits of their labor all play into that
nation’s chance of democratizing.
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Another way in which outside forces can influence a nations development is during their
war for liberation. It is often the case that without the assistance from foreign actors, rebel groups
can be overpowered by the state. This is because the regime normally has a much better trained
militant group and has access to immense resources. This period of civil war within a country is
the ideal time for a foreign actor to step in and assist the weaker party. It has often been the case
that nations who are sympathetic to certain causes assist in the efforts of foreign groups. An
example of how the efforts of a foreign actor shaped development within a nation is China’s role
in Zimbabwe’s ar for liberation (Skagen 2008: 4). The Maoist regime was sympathetic to the
efforts of ZAPU because of ideological similarities and provided them with resources and basic
training to better their chances of defeating the settler regime. In the end, the settler regime was
defeated and ZAPU/ZANU officials took over control of the state. If it was not for this foreign
intervention, the war for liberation might have ended much differently.
Whether it be making the nation wealthier through international trade, or financially
supporting a liberation movement within the state, external actors can have immense bearing on
the developmental process of a nation. While development is most present for those on the
domestic level, the actions of those far away can influence the context surrounding the nation.
This context informs the citizenry’s perception of the world along with forming their
expectations for what is acceptable, and what should not be tolerated. Through routes like this,
international actors can apply immense pressure on domestic political development.

Liberation Movements to Political Parties
The parties that emerge within a nation’s political system garner support when they prove
to be compatible with the needs of the citizenry and are supported through collective action. The
ideology and platforms of parties that they promote stem from a want within the populace that is
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not currently advocated for. In colonial territories and settler regimes, the foreign rulers largely
ignore the cries from the native population due to the fact that their mandate to rule lies outside
of their influence. When there are demands from the people that are not being fulfilled by those
in office, nonstate movements have risen to fill the void. Many of the ideologies of modern day
political parties have been rooted in the actions of liberation movements. The actors operating
within the legitimate political process of a nation could have once been deemed radical
revolutionaries or terrorists. The organizational structure and norms of the liberation movement
are highly implicative for their ability to lay down arms, and form into a democratic political
party.
Jeroen de Zeeuw (2008) has studied this transitional time that liberation movements find
themselves immersed in. Through his case studies, he finds that a liberation movement’s
transition into political party is neither linear nor inevitable, backsliding during this period is
commonplace (Zeeuw 2008:3). He states that the network operating among leadership of a group
is influential on whether or not the liberation movement will even be able to democratize. If an
organization is highly decentralized and the decisions of the group are much more consensus
driven, that organization will be more likely to distribute power as a future party, and
government. This transition is contrasted by that of a liberation movement which had all the
authority of the group concentrated in the hands of one or two leaders. In this situation,
undergoing a complete structural and administrative change into a group which exudes
democratic values is much less feasible (Zeeuw 2008:9-10). This picture painted by Zeeuw
focuses on how the utter fabrication of an organization influences democratization, but leaves out
the story of the group; if they were successful and what did they have to do to achieve that
success.
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Bejamin Acosta (2014) fills in this gap concerning liberation movements when he argues
that what organizations were able to accomplish during their struggle is highly indicative of what
the group will do once in a more powerful position. Acosta (2014) asserts that the attitudes of the
constituent bases of liberation movements have a significant impact on the types of strategies the
organization will employ. If a liberation movement desires to keep its base of support intact, it
must take into consideration their wants and preferences. These bases of support prioritize the
achievement of the liberation movement’s goals and that leaders of the movements often seek to
accomplish these ends.
Using this intuition, Acosta argues that when an organization has only achieved partial
goal achievement through the use of violence, these organizations are more likely to enter into
the legitimate political process. This is because the organization was only able to accomplish a
portion, not the total sum of its goals using violence. Therefore, if a group wishes to accomplish
all of its goals and keep its base of support, the group must explore the legitimate political realm.
Once the group understands that it needs to work within the system by negotiating with the
formal state, they will be more likely to adopt the democratic spirit. Acosta (2014) also asserts
that if an organization achieves its goals completely through the utilization of violence, the
leaders of the group will have a more difficult time convincing its constituent base that the next
logical step is to lay down arms and democratize. This difficulty arises because the constituent
base has witnessed the effectiveness of violence and will be less likely to be swayed into
supporting a peaceful political process than if the violence used were less effective.

Democratic Pacts
When the current political order within a nation may appear widely disorganized and
unstable, parties have been able to come together and collectively incentivize specific outcomes.
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The manner in which these agreements come together is through the creation of trust-building
institutions between them (Przeworski 1991:39). While immersed in uncertainty, various
political actors have come together and planned the future of their nation. The motivation behind
the creation of these pacts according to Political Researcher Adam Przeworski, “… [I]s to protect
embryonic democratic institutions by reducing the level of conflict about policies and personnel”
(90). However, Przeworski also contends that these coalitions between the formal state and
liberation movements are contingent upon the private benefits stemming from democratic
transition. When both parties seek to gain from the termination of hostilities, these pacts provide
the state and the movement with the motivation to continue negotiations. Ultimately, the
emergence of a democratic pact is dependent on the specific dynamics of the warring parties and
how they can advance their own interests in a new system.

Contribution: Case Applications
Through my comparative case study where the stories of two different wars for liberation
have been analyzed, case applications of these general theories have arisen. One of these findings
is in accordance with the assertions of Geddes (1999) who details how an oppressive government
can be relatively stable if it continues to reward influential people in the populace in exchange
for their loyalty. Another component that is cemented by the cases is the notion of Bratton & van
de Walle (1997:83) that the domestic actors of civil society can affect immense political reform
within a given nation when they bind together. Finally, my research epitomizes the theory of
Acosta (2014) who asserted that the history surrounding liberation organizations and the group’s
constituent base preference foster the utilization of certain tactics. By analyzing the struggles for
liberation in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the abstract components of democratization theory are
made real.
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Chapter Three: Theory
Settler regimes that have come to power in nations throughout the African continent are the byproducts if colonization. These European authorities took control of African territories and imposed their
legal norms and institutions on the native populace. Throughout decades of this rule dominating the land
as well as an influx of the colonizers own civilians settling in the area, the population within much of the
African territory becomes bi-furcated. On one end of the social hierarchy are native black Africans while
on the other are the Europeans who set out to make this acquired land their very own. The dynamic that
emerges between these two distinct groupings is unique. It becomes a situation where both understand the
land to be rightfully their own. The native black Africans feel an attachment because their homelands had
been within the confines of the territory for generations, and the white colonizers feel a deep connection
because people of their own ethnicity control the state. With this dynamic in place, the seeds for future
conflict between the two groups are planted.
At a particular point in time, the political and social system comes under pressure from forces that
seek to alter the status quo. Those who are currently cemented at the bottom of a nation’s stratification
often bring the stress that ignites the call and movement towards change (Wood 200: 197). When the
desire and need for national reformation is salient among a large enough segment of the populace,
liberation movements arise on the wave of public outcry. These organizations operate within a state they
wish to alter and seek to tear away state control from the grips of the setter regime, for this institution still
imposes the ideals and cultures of the colonizing nation. It is these ideals and controls which have become
intolerable.
The price of being a native in this nation of foreigners has been too great and liberation
movements find their niche within the hearts of the discontented. These nonstate actors undertake the
endeavor to transform a status quo so that it will best suit their own needs as a people. However, one
component of this undertaking that must be remembered is that it, by definition, occurs within a nation
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where a settler regime is currently wielding dominant authority. I argue that the ability for liberation
movements to affect change within a nation is dependent on the stability and power of the regime.
The tactics and whether or not a liberation movement is able to succeed is dependent on the
context in which it operates. Because these power-seeking organizations wish to reform the existing
social and political structure, they are immediately categorized as a ‘threat’ by the settler regime. In the
context of this comparative case study, the word threat can be defined as the ability of the rebels to
successfully fight off government troops and push the soldiers from designated military bases; this in turn
pressures state officials to negotiate terms for peace. The government understands that its claim of
authority is being called into question by a segment of the populace, and this liberation group is the
materialization of those forces. With the cries for freedom from the settler regime, the liberation
movement motivates the native citizenry. The leaders of these movements often claim to be the rightful
liberators, for it are their demands that aim to lift the weight of the foreign chains and shackles. According
to these emerging leaders, the settler regimes have been binding the limbs of the native population,
keeping them from reaching their salvation.
When these two powers within the nation interact and clash with one another, their power
dynamic will be made known. I assert that it is this distribution of authority between the liberation
movement and the settler regime that determines the result of the armed struggle. Ultimately, in order to
foster change within the political landscape of the nation, the liberation movement must impose pressure
on the existing regime. The magnitude of this pressure coupled with the strength of the settler regime
dictate whether a democracy or a dictatorship will arise after the conflict.

Relatively Unequal Distribution of Power
The armed struggle that occurs between the liberation movement and the settler regime allows
both parties to demonstrate their strength. Through activities both non-violent and violent, the nonstate
actor displays how much authority it truly acts with. It is not only the efficiency and capability of the
organization that is shown, but also the extent of support it musters from the populace. These two features
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of the liberation movement have a bearing on whether or not the group will be able to pose a serious
threat to the settler regime. In the event that either the settler regime is greatly embedded and has an apt
military at its disposal, or the liberation movement cannot generate much support from the populace, the
outcome of conflict will represent that relative power dynamic.
When a liberation movement has difficulty and cannot easily pose a threat to the sovereignty of
the government and their forces, their ability to affect change within the nation is greatly hampered.
Although the nonstate actor can rally certain segments of the populace and demonstrate discontent within
the nation, the sanctity of the settler regime’s positioning is never truly be called into question. In this
sense, the liberation organization becomes more of a pestilence and less of an imminent threat. The
lacking capacity of the liberation movement to create unfavorable conditions for the settler regime will
have grave implications for the outcome of their armed struggle. In the context of this paper, unfavorable
conditions are a broad term referring to the struggles and strains imposed on the government because of
the efforts of the liberation movements. These types of conditions can include mass military casualties,
wide-spread public unrest, condemnation from international institutions, along with anything else that
poses a cost for the governing regime. The term mass casualties denotes the losses and strains placed
upon the state forces; these casualties could be a loss of life or loss of military resources such as
weaponry and bases. Essentially, it is any type of cost that the guerillas can impose on the state.
When liberation movements are relatively weak and they cannot force the government to concede
on any conditions pertaining to their rule, changes that the rebels seek to promote do not happen quickly
if at all. The desired reforms are slow to materialize because the settler regime feels as though appeasing
the movement with any kind of compromise to be unnecessary. Government officials need to consider the
fact that if they give into the commands from an organization that cannot impede their governance, what
could happen if an even stronger group emerges and calls for revolution? Essentially, cost benefit analysis
of status quo maintenance by the settler regime does not lead to much compromise between the two
parties (Bratton & van de Walle 1997:83). Whereas if the organization posed a serious threat to the
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regime and the government would be willing to compromise to end the conflict quickly, this weaker
groups efforts become stifled over time. This is not to say that the rebels cannot impact the status quo at
all, just not to the extent that a stronger organization would be able to.
This being the case, the liberation group becomes stalled in their effort to effect change within the
political structure. However, this does not mean that the movement has no chance at achieving its goals.
Because progress is not being made with violent tactics, the organization must adopt new strategies if it
wishes to incite change (Matanock & Staniland 2018: 720). These organizations are malleable and fluid,
just because the group acted in a particular way at one point in time does not mean that they cannot adopt
different approaches in the future. The context of their struggle for liberation informs whether or not and
what type of transformation will occur. In this circumstance where the emerging group is relatively weak
when compared to the settler regime, this standing pushes the organization to moderate its views and
tactics. This relaxation is the result of the lack of progress achieved through the exercise of violent
options.
As mentioned previously, the liberation group might be largely stifled by the strength of the
government, but the rebels can still apply some pressure on the settler regime. Over time, this constant
pressure brought on by the movement and popular discontent can accumulate and pose significant costs
for maintaining the current governing structure. What may only be small rumblings, can turn into deep
cracks if ignored by those in power. Throughout the period when the radical acts of the liberation
movement were only met by staunch opposition, leading officials soon come to the realization that these
violent acts succeeded in getting them depicted as terrorists. As powerless extremists, the organization
would not be able to succeed in reforming the nation. This shortcoming moivates the group to adopt more
of a balanced and temperate approach to politics. Their earlier failures demonstrated the need for them to
operate within their means. If the leaders of the liberation movement hope to affect change within the
nation, other more mild approaches to reform have to be explored.
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At this point during the war for liberation, the once weak and radical organization has been forced
to adopt more moderate routes as a means to reform the nations governing structure. This transition in
tandem with the fact that the government now seeks to put the constant nuisance to an end, negotiations
between the two parties begin. The conversations among these parties concerning alterations to the
current political landscape are meaningful. Both actors have an interest in appeasing the other. The costs
of status quo maintenance have risen significantly throughout the course of the armed struggle for the
settler regime and negotiating an end to the conflict would remove those burdens. For the liberation
movement, this is the best chance the organization has had so far to achieve its goals.
Through these talks, both parties participate in deliberations where their interests are heard and
meaningfully considered and possible solutions are able to be debated. The groups seek to benefit from a
change in the circumstances and governmental structure. In order to conceive of a condition where both
blocs will be better off, the two form an agreement to ensure their mutual survival. In these democratic
pacts, the groups agree to end the current conflict with the promise to develop a system where both would
be better off after the termination of hostilities (Przeworski 1991:39). When these institutions are
brokered between the parties, both organizations have the incentive to allow the other to survive.
Essentially, the formal government and liberation movement align their self-interests with the common
good.
Through this democratic pact, both parties comprehend the benefits of working within the formal
system. Instead of usurping authority and continuing the use of violent tactics, the liberation organization
created a system that was too costly to maintain and forced negotiations are a result. In this circumstance,
the organization was only able to achieve partial success of its outcome goals by violence. Once this
violent route became exhausted, the liberation group moved to more peaceful and formal negotiations
with the regime. This in turn promoted the benefits of a more democratic approach and fostered a new
government that was centered on the ideal of negotiation and deliberation.
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It is vital to understand that this organization had no other option to enter the formal political fray
than to enter these meaningful negotiations; they could not conquer the state on the battlefield so they had
to utilize other peaceful methods that did not require military might. Not only are officials within the
party convinced of the success that can occur through democratic practices, but the base supporters of the
movement as well. This ideal outcome required politics to be done in a peaceful and diplomatic approach;
the native populace was able to be appeased using the democratic process. This in turn further solidifies
the fruits of working within the system to promote positive political change. Through this type of process
nearly all within the party recognize that institutional reform is possible when organizations can enter a
process in which both sides are meaningfully heard.
After the deliberations between the parties have come to an end, and after possible solutions to
the conflict have been debated, an agreement is eventually found that is acceptable for all the sides
involved. With this new plan for the direction of the nation, the once liberation movement has the ability
to become a formal political actor, but only through the ballot box. This is the first experience the new
party has in operating as a democratic political party, and once they win, it is yet another example of how
these democratic practices can be beneficial in the quest to gain power within the state. Therefore, when
“politics” is done within the nation under the new political configuration, those democratic practices will
be maintained. The party’s supporters and its base have been exposed to how meaningful and peaceful
negotiations can take the organization from a liberation movement, to the formal offices of the state. This
group was able to successfully transition and gain the ability to control the state through the democratic
process. These methods that proved valuable in the months after the war for liberation has ended and the
organization will continue to employ them in the years to come.

Relatively Equal Distribution of Power
When there is a relatively equal distribution of power between the liberation movement and the
settler regime, a dictatorship is likely to emerge after the conflict between the two parties has terminated.
The logical steps that lead to this assertion will be made clear in the following section. For it is the
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pressures that the liberation movement can apply to the sanctity of the settler regime that ultimately affect
what certain parties will be willing to concede.
Stress applied by a forceful liberation movement causes cracks and splits within the existing
status quo. The ways in which the emerging liberation movement can demonstrate its clout and squeeze
the settler regime are plentiful. An example of this kind of pressure occurs when a movement can carve
out areas within the nation where the rule of the settler regime (McColl 1969: 624). The Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was able to control areas within Colombia during its guerilla war
(Petras & Brescia 2000: 143). Their ability to drive government forces from specific areas within the state
allowed them to manipulate the government in ways in which it could have not done if the guerillas did
not control these areas. Their presence increased the incentives for the government to cave to a portion of
the guerilla’s demands. By succeeding at an end such as this, the lack of governmental capacity is made
known to both domestic and international onlookers. Additionally, if the movement can inflict mass
casualties on military personnel and the citizenry, these actions too will cause an increased pressure upon
the settler regime to reform quickly.
Regardless of the tactics that the liberation group uses to create instability and disorganization for
the settler regime, the ineptitude of the government is made apparent. The consequence of these types of
actions resulting in sovereignty usurpation is that these audiences will recognize that the settler regime no
longer commands the nation in an uncontested manner. These dark marks inflicted upon the reputation of
the government will drastically decrease the effectiveness of its voice. If it cannot fend off the attacks
from a rising liberation movement, how can it be considered as the rightful keeper of authority? The
legitimacy of the government suffers when it cannot dominate and control the efforts of this non-state
actor. Furthermore, when the liberation movement causes instability in the government, they signal to
others that officials within their movement may be the best form of alternative leadership (Bratton & van
de Walle 1997:100).

28
When the authority of the emerging liberation organization is steadily climbing, the power
afforded to the settler regime falls. In a circumstance where both parties are in contest for control of the
region, it is a zero-sum game. For the liberation movement to gain support within the populace and the
international community, is for the current government to lose that support. All of this culminates in the
creation of a very precarious position for the settler regime. They are not only losing the capacity to carry
out administrative matters within their own territory, but their legitimacy is weakened. Essentially, the
costs brought on by the liberation movement are both symbolic and logistical.
The intensity of these costs on the settler regime dictate the urge that the government will have to
succumb to the interests of the liberation movement. As demonstrated so far, the enhanced authority of
the nonstate actor places them in a superior position in their quest to alter the current political landscape.
Their strength and the threat they pose to the established order pushes the settler regime to the point of
where the costs of maintaining the status quo no longer exceed the benefit of retaining control; for the
paramount interest of the regime is political survival (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). If the regime keeps
the war waging, they will only damage their own interests further. Therefore, the government must seek
to put an end to the hostilities by any means necessary.
Because the war for liberation has caused enough damage to the existing status quo and the settler
regime is aware that it is unable to contain the nonstate actor’s efforts, it is of little use for the government
to refuse the calls of the rising movement. For the regime to wholeheartedly refuse the terms given by the
liberation movement, is to invite in once again costly conflict. When this is the case, the liberation
movement will barely if at all have to moderate themselves and their platform. The clout it brings along
with the command with which speaks allows the group to give up less, while demanding more. Its
fierceness coupled with its threats of destruction allows its demands to go undiluted. If the liberation
movement did not pose this danger to the settler regime and was not able to create costly status quo
maintenance, their terms for reform would not be as potent. In the end when a deal is finally struck
between the two parties, the strength of the liberation organization will be evident in the terms. From then
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on, the nonstate actor will be able to cement itself as the true wielder of authority within the territory. As
the liberation group transforms into an institutionalized political party, the group will understand and
know what it had to accomplish to achieve such a position of authority.
The method that has allowed this organization to achieve its political goals was the violence it
employed. For the liberation movement, it was only possible to force the settler regime to the negotiating
table using radical tactics. These activities of the nonstate actor resulted in the need for the settler regime
to recalibrate their cost/benefit calculations. Only by creating a circumstance where it was no longer
logical for the government to maintain authority were the officials of the liberation able to promote their
own agendas. However, it must be understood that it was not just these officials within the movement that
had much at stake. Their underpinnings were upheld by a base constituency who also sought to gain by
the liberation movement’s success.
Citizens empowered the leaders of the liberation movement and even at times, partook in their
radical activities that influenced the outcome of the armed struggle; the movement would not have
achieved its ideal outcome without their support. The preferences of these people matter and have a
bearing on how the liberation movement will act. If the officials of the movement did not take their
choices in to account, they would lack much needed popularity. This being the case, if the base
constituency has a preference for a specific tactic such as the use of wide-spread radical violence, the
organization is pressured to complete that desired end (Acosta 2014:667). Moreover, these native citizens
that the party has catered to are the underpinning of the movement. If the constituency felt as though the
organization was no longer representing their interests, they would cease to support the group and it
would no longer be capable of surviving.
It is understandable that the liberation movement’s constituency can find it easy to retain its
preference for violence once the armed struggle has ended and the organization has transitioned to an
institutionalized political party. In this case where both of the warring factions had relatively equal
strength to one another, the only reason why the nonstate actor succeeded at usurping authority was
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because of violence. The group did not rely on their ability to communicate, negotiate, or appease the
government. The leaders of the movement and their supporters saw the fruits that are associated with
power. It is vital to understand that this is not just any type of strength, it is specifically power that is used
to promote an ideology that is undiluted from the policies of others. This influence of the liberation
organization is used to dominate other voices on the floor; a factor that is addictive once it utilized by
power-seeking liberation leaders.
The liberation achieved the total-sum of its goals using militaristic violence; the populace was
able to eject the foreign settler regime out of power by using their might. The witnesses of this use of
clout are not only those who were present at the negotiation table, but the cadres of the organization.
Through the threat they posed to the state’s fundamental political institutions, they were able to achieve
the totality of their ideal outcomes. This success sets the expectations for how conflicts and the political
process will be handled in the future within the state. The culture for this type of aggressive and often
violent political dealings is cemented among the leadership and their supporters. In fact, the constituent
base of the rebels with their preference for violence can even pressure party leaders to continue to utilize
these militant tactics as a means of achieving their ideal outcomes in the future. The developed preference
for violence by the cadres of the party is yet another force acting upon the officials to maintain their
dictatorial tendencies which have promoted such beneficial change in the past.
This triumph achieved with brute force does not foster the transition from armed liberation
movement to democratic political party. Too many interests within the revolution have been satisfied by
arms to facilitate any dropping of them. As the organization enters the formal political fray, they do so
with immense pressure acting upon them to retain their radical and militant tactics. When other
organizations attempt to challenge them at this future point, they will be met with the same level of
resistance that the party utilized to consolidate power after the war for liberation had been won. Those
leading and those supporting the party both have the incentives to maintain their preference for violence
because of the immense success of the liberation movement. This will lead to the domination of the party

31
when it becomes the legitimate political actor, and they will meet any challenges to their claim on the
territory with great force; the essential characteristic of an undemocratic political regime.

Implications of Power Dynamics
The relative power dynamic between the liberation movement and the state has great implications
for the prospects of democratization within the nation. When the forces of the rebel organization are
definitively weaker than that of the formal state, that power imbalance will be felt in nearly every aspect
of the war for liberation. While the rebels can attempt to inflict casualties on the governing structure, their
efforts to do so never seriously challenge the stability of the regime. The organization can fight and
bitterly resent the actions of the government, but never will it be able to take control over large swaths of
territory or impose mass casualties on the regime. Nevertheless, there are ways for the liberation group to
impose costs on the government’s ability to maintain the status quo. Whether it be inciting wide-spread
protest or creating uncertainty among leaders of financial industry, the rebel group can negatively impact
the ability of the government to rule over the territory. This then results in the incentive for state leaders
to enter negotiations.
During these deliberations, the liberation movement is essentially functioning at the will of the
regime. While their forces could not themselves bring the state to the table, the enduring costs they
brought on to the government incentivized the ruling elite to put an end to the conflict. This being the
case, it necessitated that the leaders of the movements fully relied on the other party in the process of
formulating a new plan for the state. Stemming from this were meaningful deliberations and debates
where one organization wholly relied on the other; negotiations became characterized by compliance, not
domination. At the end of these talks, both parties were able to work with one another as a means of
reaching mutually acceptable terms; the liberation group and the state officials were able to come together
and forge a document that was beneficial for all. From these talks came the ability for the rebels to enter
the formal state; this by very nature is a fundamental democratic practice. The fruits of this method came
known to all levels of the rebel organization, from the supporters to the leadership. Because this was such
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a crucial victory for the liberation movement at this early stage in its political development, the entirety of
the organization is aware of the advantages that democracy brings. From this point forward, the
organization will utilize democratic practices once it becomes an actor in the legitimate political process.
When the forces of the rebel organization pose a great threat to the regime by causing mass
casualties and by controlling large swaths of territory within the nation, the have the ability to manipulate
the government in powerful ways. Because the liberation force has the ability to shake the sanctity of the
state to its very core in addition to being the cause of instability and unrest, the government must make
the decision to allow this chaos to continue or concede to the wants of the rebels. At this point, the
government comes to the understanding that this potent fighting force within its borders cannot be
stopped as the state has on numerous occasions acted to halt their efforts to no avail. This being the case,
the state will opt for negotiations in the attempt to quell the violence and put a stop to the immense costs
it has taken on so far in the conflict; it has become clear that this is their only real chance at ending the
conflict on favorable terms. However, the rebel organization has also come to understand their powerful
position in the conflict and will seek to utilize its power in pursuance of its ideal outcomes. This involves
threatening the regime with more warfare if the deliberations do not appear to be producing favorable
terms for the liberation movement. Knowing that the state cannot suppress these forces on the battlefield,
the regime will have no other choice but to give into their demands. The achieved solution will then be
highly favorable for the liberation group as they will not have needed to meaningfully consider the terms
set by the state during the negotiation process. This success of the liberation movement will further
promote their violent and power-based methods of forcing their political opponents into submission. This
all culminates in the following hypothesis:
When liberation movements and governments have relatively equal power during wars for liberation,
the nation is less likely to democratize after conflict
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Chapter Four: Research Design
The relationship between the settler regime and the liberation movement during conflict
in terms of the distribution of power between them has implications for that nation’s prospects of
democratization. The types of interactions that occur between these two power-seeking bodies
shapes the expectations and norms for how political dealings will occur during the states’ next
period of development. In order to analyze the relevancy of this theoretical approach, case-based
research methods best supplement the study. I have chosen two cases to evaluate the
applicability of the aforementioned theory. These cases are suited for a comparative case study
of the most similar systems design, in which cases that share similar characteristics and qualities
but have divergent outcomes are analyzed (Sartori 1970). Two cases that exude these similar
qualities are South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Independent Variable: Power distribution
My independent variable is the relative power dynamic between the settler regime and
the liberation movement. I will operationalize this variable within the context of the armed
struggle of South Africa and Zimbabwe through a variety of mechanisms. Primarily, I use
secondary sources to analyze how the war was carried out; determining who was able to impose
costs on who, and to what extent each side was successful at doing so. Through the investigation
of these dynamics, I am able to determine the relationship between the warring parties. From this
perspective, it is discernable which of the organizations was forced into a weaker position as a
result of the other’s efforts. This pressure to concede is brought upon by organizational strength.
If the liberation movement had the wherewithal to bring on taxing conditions for the settler
regime for a long period of time, the government would be more likely to settle for an
arrangement much quicker than if the nonstate actor was weaker.
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In any case, the independent variable, which is the distribution of power among the
actors, is the reason why South Africa has become a champion of democracy within Africa while
Zimbabwe has failed to adopt democratic values. The power of the ZANU-PF was immense and
the group proved to be a great threat to the Rhodesian government. This being the relationship
between the state and the nonstate actor, ZANU-PF was able to enter negotiations with clout.
From this elevated position, the group entered the formal political fray and consolidated
authority once it became a legitimate actor. However, this was not the case for the ANC of South
Africa who found their efforts to be heavily stifled by the state. Unlike the ZANU-PF, the ANC
could not threaten the regime in as much as to force them into a concessionary position. This
forced the ANC to adopt more diplomatic and less violent tactics in order to obtain power within
the territory. This power imbalance would ultimately nurture democratic tendencies within the
organization that would then be later used by the group as the legitimate wielder of authority
within the state.

Dependent Variable: Democratization
My dependent variable is democratization within the nations. Specifically, I analyze how
the political institutions within South Africa and Zimbabwe have developed in the years after
their wars for liberation had ended. I operationalize this variable by examining democratic
development in three distinct categories: the presence of competition for public office within the
nation, political participation from multiple parties, and rights and liberties afforded to the people
and civil society. These three groupings encompass much of what is fundamental for a
democracy, and therefore are relevant to the analysis of political development (Dahl 1989: 222).
Since the end of the armed struggles within Zimbabwe and South Africa during the latter
part of the 20th century, the states have gone down two different paths; one towards democracy
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and the other towards dictatorship. This demarcation between the two nations began at the end of
their liberation movements. In the case of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe rose to the highest office
in government and restrained democratic progress at nearly every turn. Contrastingly in South
Africa, the ANC rose to power after the conflict had transpired and set the stage for the nation to
go down the path towards political development.
According to the 2018 Freedom in the World report, the organization categorized South
Africa as free, and Zimbabwe as partly free. On a scale from 0-100 (0=least free 100=most free),
Zimbabwe scored a 30 while South Africa scored a 78. To put this into a larger perspective, the
United States received an 84 and Russia garnered a 20. While there are nations that have been
categorized as less free than Zimbabwe, still exists a great discrepancy between that nation and
South Africa. In terms of civil liberties and political rights however, Zimbabwe’s lack of political
development becomes much clearer. On a scale from 1-7 (1=most free 7=least free) Zimbabwe
scored a 6 for political rights and a 5 for civil liberties. South Africa managed to score near the
top with a 2 in both categories.
This report from the Freedom House offers a glimpse into just how differently these
countries have developed since the termination of hostilities with the earlier settler regimes. This
resource will provide me with the data necessary to perform my analysis and assist me in
answering the question of why this vast separation between these two regional neighbors
occurred.

South African War for Liberation
The African National Congress (ANC) incited the war for liberation within South Africa.
This organization entered the political fray during the first two decades of the 20th century when
it first was a party by the name of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC). As a
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member of the formal state, the group’s main focus was on the advancement of black voting
rights within the territory; a right that had been nullified by the colonial regime. As time passed,
the political landscape within the territory developed into terrain that was much more oppressive
and race-based. The apartheid government came into being in the 1940’s and the ANC began to
fight against the racial oppression committed by the elite-white minority government. The early
efforts of the ANC were targeted at promoting their ideals for universal rights and equality
through the legitimate political process. What began as nonviolent protests eventually
transformed into something much more radical within South Africa. When the ANC concluded
that the apartheid government could not be toppled by use of the formal systems, the ANC
adopted violence as a means of carrying out an armed struggle against the regime.
Because of their persistent efforts to alter the colonial regime, the organization was
banned from formal political involvement in 1960. The ANC persevered through turmoil and
raised the costs of ruling over the territory. Although militarily weaker than the apartheid
government, the supporters of the movement endured throughout the conflict. This resolve of the
organizational leadership as well as its native base resulted in the continuous accumulation of
costs for status quo maintenance which was felt by the governing structure. Essentially, the
rebels were able to cause enough disturbance within the nation that the economy was greatly
impacted. This lack luster financial performance added additional pressure on the settler regime
to reconfigure the political system.
This increased price of rule while immersed in the armed struggle motivated the settler
regime to negotiate with those who sought to reform South Africa. Through these talks, the
colonial regime began to recognize the ANC as a legitimate actor and lifted the ban on their
party association during the early 1990’s. Because of these talks, the ANC was allowed to run in
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national elections in the years after the conflict had ended. Through this route, ANC leader
Nelson Mandela became the President of South Africa in 1994. Since this point, the nation was
transformed from a repressive minority led colonial state, to a strong beacon of democratic light
on the African continent.

Zimbabwean War for Liberation
The armed struggle between the then Rhodesian government and the liberation
movement in Zimbabwe occurred during the latter part of the 20th century. During this struggle,
the elite white minority colonizers sought to protect their control over the African territory
against Zimbabwean nationals. The conflict arose due to the wide-spread discontentment among
the native populace against the current governing structure. The white Rhodesian government led
by Ian Smith exercised European and Western policies on the black Africans who were being
overwhelmingly disenfranchised by the political system. These subjugating laws unfairly
discriminated against the native black population as their rights and freedoms were vastly limited
by the rule of the settler regime. The discontent that these policies generated materialized in the
formation of a formidable rebel organization. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
was formed in 1963; prior to this establishment, the organization was a part of a similar yet
distinct organization, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU).
From the group’s inception, the ZANU undertook on a violent guerilla campaign.
Through being heavily influenced by Maoist groups in China, the ZANU fighters exacerbated
nearly every route in the effort to destabilize the Rhodesian government. Throughout some of the
different organizations who sought reform, the ideology of ZANU was characterized by the most
radical ideology. For this organization desired nothing other than the complete removal of white
minority rule within the territory. In order to accomplish this end, the Rhodesian government
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would not only need to be forced to the negotiation table, but rather, fought and beat into
submission by the rebels. This mountainous task required ZANU leadership to attract as much
support as possible.
Although ZANU’s radical ideology attracted a small and dedicated portion of the native
citizenry, the organization also coerced poor and uneducated peasants to join their cause. This
increase in fighters resulted in the creation of a very formidable fighting force. Over the course
of the conflict, the rebels were able to wage a strong campaign against the regime. Not only were
the ZANU rebels successful in defeating the Rhodesian government on numerous occasions, but
the prolonged struggle stifled economic growth. Both of these forces played a critical role in
bringing about a ceasefire agreement.
In 1979, the Lancaster House agreement was signed and put an end to the Rhodesian
Bush War. This conclusion to the conflict was facilitated by the direct efforts of the British
Parliament to bring the leaders of the liberation movement Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo
together with leaders of the Rhodesian government Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa. With the
signing of this ceasefire, both parties agreed to terms which would allow for Zimbabwean
independence as well as national elections to be held the following year in 1980. During these
elections, ZANU leader Robert Mugabe rose to the prime minister position. Although the
liberation movement and its supporters succeeded in ending the oppressive rule of the colonizers,
the rise of Robert Mugabe has plagued the developmental progress of Zimbabwe. Since his win
in 1980, the leader consolidated his power and imposed immense pain and suffering on the
native population. Under his rule, the once potential democratic nation has faded into deep seated
autocratic neopatrimonialist rule.
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Similarities of the Cases: South African and Zimbabwean Wars for Liberation
The liberation movements that have operated in South Africa and Zimbabwe were
functioning within strikingly similar contexts. Principally, these rebellions were incited within
European settler regimes that imposed white minority rule over the native populace. Throughout
the course of this colonial rule, officials within positions of power constrained the rights and
freedoms of the native people. The seemingly unending turmoil that the colonizers embroiled the
native populace in was extremely taxing. This oppression of the domestic citizenry in both of the
cases culminated in the materialization of liberation movements that sought to reform the
governing structure. In Zimbabwe, the lives of the native citizenry were regulated to an extreme
extent; unjustly by the settler regime. Facing similarly trying circumstances were native South
Africans who were subject to the racist prejudices of apartheid rule.
Upheaving the status quo is a task that the liberation movements sought to accomplish.
The leaders of the organizations understood the governing structure to be the illegitimate
wielders of authority. However, disapproval in and of itself is not enough to convince political
officials to willingly concede their position. Therefore, the leaders of both liberation movements
partook in violent campaigns against the citizenry as well as the state to shift their message into
the national conversation. These threatening actions were completed in tandem with the
promotion of the organization’s radical ideologies. The force behind the ideologies was
empowered by the continued discontent among the native populace, for the government did not
seek to appease them and reform the political structure of the territory given their claims.
The lack of compromise and consideration coming from the settler regime caused many
within the native population to rise and join the rebellion in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The
government officials who were at the helm of these nations sought to extend their command over
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the territory for as long as possible and hesitated to grant any legitimacy to the liberation
movement. If the settler regime was to concede to the liberation movement early on in their
campaign, the government would validate treasonous efforts. Therefore, colonizers did not give
in to the calls from the native citizenry and sought to depict the liberators as radical terrorists as
was the case for the ANC and ZANU who were both banned to participate in the formal political
system. Because of this, the oppressive conditions exercised within the nation’s borders did not
cease.
The longer the settler regime refused to reform its policies, the more support the
liberation movements received from the native populace. Instead of appearing as a negotiating
body, the settler regime began to take upon dictatorial form. This in turn motivated more of the
native citizenry to back the efforts of the rebels. In both of these South African and Zimbabwean
cases, the rebels were able to attract broad swaths of the moderate citizenry to support their
cause; they were not merely made up by those whose ideologies were at the far end of the
political spectrum. However, the unyielding stance that the settler regime took not only had a
keen impact on the type of support that the rebels received.
The ceaseless application of oppressive conditions brought on by the colonizers in
tandem with the ideology of the rebels allowed them to attract support from foreign nations. The
restricted rights and liberties afforded to the blacks living under the apartheid government
warranted the support of the United Nations in condemnation and sanctions placed upon the state
(Meli 1988: 140). Additionally, ZANU/ZAPU cadres received direct military support, training,
and supplies from Mozambique and China in order to overthrow the blatantly racist Rhodesian
government (Skagen 2008: 4). The efforts of these liberation movements were supplemented by
the backing of external actors. This support came in the form of military training, much needed
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resources, as well as the public denunciation of the settler regime. Essentially, because of the
policies of the colonizers in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the rebels were able to garner the
support of a large part of the native citizenry as well as powerful international actors.
Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between the liberation movements. This
dissimilarity largely accounts for the divergent outcomes of the distinct armed struggles. This
discrepancy becomes evident when the democratic consolidation that has occurred within the
countries after liberation is analyzed. In the case of Zimbabwe, the ruling elite who fostered the
transition from white-minority to black majority have remained in that position of authority for
decades (Chung 2006: 258). Since the nationalists took over, power has remained in the hands of
a few who claim ownership of the country based on their victories during the revolution. Because
this group succeeded at defeating the government militarily on many different occasions and was
able to destabilize the political order, the leadership now claims that any challenge to their
authority is ultimately treasonous. These powerful men have taken the country down a long
period of oppression and dictatorship where the voices of a few command the lives of the many.
However, these oppressive and dictatorial conditions are not present in South Africa.
Since liberation, the organization has adopted much more liberal and democratic policies aimed
at ensuring the rights and freedoms of all living within the territory. Largely, the state is
considered to be one of the highest-functioning democracies on the entire African continent. The
figurehead of the ANC movement Nelson Mandela is famous and known throughout the world
as a man who has brought peace and prosperity to the South African people . The actions the
organization took during liberation have been acknowledged as necessary and just by onlookers;
that the true Africans were able to win back their nation and institute democratic and progressive
institutions. Essentially, South Africa has been the standard to which other emerging
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democracies on the continent are compared to. They are the success story of liberation
movement turned institutionalized democratic political party.
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Chapter Five: Evidence
Zimbabwe: Liberation to dictatorship
During the mid-1960’s, Rhodesia’s elite-white minority government exercised immense
power over the citizenry of the nation. White Europeans administered the territory through an
intricate political system that involved the British Parliament and along with European provincial
governments within central Africa. Although far from London, many British citizens immigrated
to Rhodesia in order to be part of one of the most prosperous federations within all of Africa.
These immigrating Europeans sought to advance their own interests by moving to a territory
where those of their own race were the wielders of authority. In this state, the British considered
themselves to be culturally, socially, and politically superior when compared to the native black
populace. This was one of the motivating factors behind the move of European peoples into the
territory. Europeans sought to enter a new foreign world where they could feel secure of their
heightened status.
In Rhodesia, the sentiment of white superiority over the native black population was by
no means hidden. In fact, it was at the forefront of the popular consciousness. According
Southern Rhodesian Nationalist and founder of the Zimbabwean African National Union
(ZANU), blacks were instructed to refer to white men as kings, women as queens, and boys and
girls, as prince and princess. In essence, “the whole European community was composed of
royalty” (End of Empire 1985). This rhetoric and way of thought is foundational for
understanding why these foreign agents felt as though they could rule over the territory and
proscribe certain rules on the differing races.
What the British and white Rhodesian officials attempted to organize was not however,
an all-white European government. These officials specifically did not seek to formulate a
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system similar to that of South African apartheid rule where blacks were largely unable to take
part in the political process. These native Africans did have a presence in the Rhodesian political
system, although their ability to affect change within the government was limited due to their
small-allowed attendance. Nevertheless, it was clear that although the Rhodesians stated that
they wanted to formulate an institutional order that would have the Europeans and the natives
work together, this was far from what actually materialized.
Throughout the period of when white Rhodesians along with the British Parliament
wielded authority over the territory, they restrained the rights and freedoms afforded to the native
citizenry. While there were many policies that restrained the actions of blacks within Rhodesia
more so than the white Europeans in day to day life, the discrimination within the educational
system was very salient within members of the African community. While the white Rhodesian
government did provide the blacks with sufficient lower-level education, the support these
Africans received in secondary and tertiary levels paled in comparison to that of what whites
received from the state (Austin 1975:40). This discriminatory circumstance was further
compounded by the fact that if any African sought education in areas where whites were taught,
they needed the expressed written permission of the Rhodesian government (Austin 1975:40).
This structure within the Rhodesian society was one of the ways in which the underlying
feelings concerning white superiority materialized in the political climate. It also exhibits how
even though the colonizers stated that the goal of their rule was to eventually create an equal
multiracial society, they were certainly not setting the proper foundations for doing so. In
addition to these oppressions within the educational system, the laws of the Rhodesian
government denied most blacks entry into governmental positions, lack of voting rights, and
largely restricted property rights. Essentially, under a system such as this where the ruling party
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made it nearly impossible for blacks to become equal under the formal law, change had to be
made if the Africans were going to be able to take back their country (Kirkman 1969:651).
Repeated attempts were made by native African leadership to change the formal constitution to
lessen discrimination and solidify the rights of the black community; to gain equal opportunity
within Rhodesia.
However, it soon became apparent to members of the native populace that their freedom
would likely never be achieved under the rule of a minority government coalition. In early
December of 1961, the need for black liberation and autonomy within the territory finally
materialized in the creation of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). Joshua Nkomo
who had extensive experience in the political fray led this organization; he was a Zimbabwean
politician who had fought on the side of the black nationalists in the region. He also operated in
South Africa as a former president of the African National Congress (ANC). This group sought
to abolish minority rule within Rhodesia and institute a one-man-one-vote system where blacks
had full authority and involvement in the political process. An additional goal was the total
elimination of legal discrimination in the territory in tandem with recognition of traditional
African political systems. ZAPU leadership determined that the route which would most likely
result in the achievement of their goals would be to rely on help from international actors; not
necessarily to face the government directly. Additionally, the organization also had an armed
segment: the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA).
This militarized faction played a part in the ensuing guerrilla war against the regime.
However as will soon be described, their presence during the war for liberation was not as
effective as other groups who fought against the dominating political organization.
Unfortunately, for the organization, these revolutionary aims and violent nature of the group’s
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members resulted in ZAPU being formally banned within the state by 1964 (Skagen 2008: 7).
Nevertheless, this ban from the government did not dissolve Nkomo’s group; it merely forced
them to carry out their activities outside of the formal political process.
Within this political landscape, the movement towards black liberation began to attract
more support and attention from the native populace. Because of this rise in interest for
revolution, different black leaders rose with their own conceptions of ways in which Africans
could take control of their nation’s political process. One of these rising politicians was
Ndabaningi Sithole who founded the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in the August
of 1963. With the help of his fellow group administrator Robert Mugabe, ZANU undertook its
campaign against the oppressive and discriminatory status quo. This new organization sought to
accomplish very similar ends as ZAPU, but believed an alternative route was necessary for black
liberation within the territory. The major point of difference between ZANU and ZAPU was that
while the latter thought more moderate tactics using the current system would prove fruitful for
their cause, the former was clearly set on a violent armed struggle against the settler regime from
its inception. Even though ZAPU did have an armed segment, proponents of ZANU did not
agree with the lack of urgency and emphasis on violence the organization employed. Therefore,
the organization decided to form its own armed wing.
ZANU as an organization was more dedicated to the employment of guerrilla warfare
than ZAPU. Because of this emphasis on radical means, an entire armed wing of the organization
formed: the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). This segment of the
resistance struggle received direct support from the People’s Republic of China where ZANLA
fighters received training in how to carry out an enduring campaign against the state. These
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Maoist operatives imparted their education on ZANLA members with a specific emphasis on the
importance of gaining the support from the lower classes of Rhodesian society (Skagen 2008: 4).
Specifically, ZANLA operatives received formal training from experienced Chinese
soldiers at the Nanking Military College in the years prior to the first formal battle between rebel
forces and the state. Furthermore, military officials from the Asian superpower were brought to
Southern Africa to teach the fundamentals of carrying out a guerilla war. What these experts
espoused to the cadres was an emphasis on the mobilization of the lower classes, the
establishment of militia bases outside of Rhodesia, and the use of dense vegetation as a means to
remain undetected. If the organization was able to carry out these objectives, it became possible
for the rebels to secure more populated urban centers.
This alliance with the poor peasantry would assist liberation through the provision of
underground shelter to keep their whereabouts hidden from the government as well as provide
consistent material support channels. Throughout the ensuing war for the control of the state,
ZANLA operatives were the main fighters of the conflict. It is estimated that out of the entire
liberation force of roughly 28,000 soldiers, around 19,300 were ZANLA operatives and the
remaining 8,700 were ZIPRA cadres (Kriger 1992: 3). Although ZANLA and ZIPRA both
fought for black liberation from elite white minority rule, their similar ends by no means
necessitated a partnership. It was often the case that these competing organizations battled one
another for territorial control. This tension materialized in conflict at numerous points during the
guerilla war. It was not until later in the conflict in 1975 that the groups merged to create ZIPA
(Zimbabwe People’s Army) which would be a joint fighting force in support of black liberation.
Common among both ZANU and ZAPU was the utility that the groups gained through
operating within the borders of neighboring countries during their ban. Mozambique and Zambia
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provided the organizations with areas where the rebels were able to organize themselves and plan
activities. Additionally, while Zambia refused to allow these guerillas to raise armies within it’s
confines, Mozambique aided these exact activities and empowered the groups. In addition to
offering ZANU and ZAPU locations where they did not necessarily have to be constantly wary
of being dismantled by Rhodesian forces, they were also able to mobilize the populations to
support their liberating cause (Skagen 2008: 54).
The initial goal of ZANU and ZAPU in the first four years of the 1960’s was to incite
mass violence and chaos within the Rhodesian territory. This plan stemmed from a popular
thought among liberation leadership that if the settler nations appeared to be in such a state of
turmoil that they essentially became ungovernable, that the British government would intervene
on part of the Rhodesian government and negotiate a settlement in favor of ZANU and ZAPU
interests (Kriger 1992: 88). These foreign states provided the groups with the area necessary to
prepare and train their cadres to take on this task.
However, in November 1965, rebel officials were forced to alter their plans when the
Rhodesian government declared unilateral independence from Great Britain. The rationale of the
Rhodesian government to make this statement was as much logistical as it was political; for the
government felt that itself unhampered by the interests of the British Crown could best handle
the rebel forces. Additionally by declaring independence from London, the government would
not have to fear the British from prematurely conceding to black interests. Even though this was
now the case, the rebel forces maintained their path towards disturbing the existing political and
social order.
The first battle between black liberation fighters and the Rhodesia security force occurred
on April 28, 1966 in Sinoia Township. In the immediate months following the Rhodesian
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declaration of independence, state security forces traveled throughout the territory to solidify
their holds on specific regions. During this campaign to curb the nationalist uprising, the security
forces crossed paths with ZANLA rebels (Skagen 2008: 66). This was a relatively small conflict
between the two forces, as only seven liberation fighters were involved and eventually killed
because of injuries they received during the skirmish. The actions of ZANLA during this inciting
period of the war for liberation were out of hast and an inability for proper strategizing. Their
utter defeat forced ZANLA to reassess their tactics. While this defeat was crushing in the
moment, it did help the organization and increased their ability to incite change. Firstly, this
conflict was reported on extensively; nearly everyone became aware that the ZANLA
nationalists engaged with soldiers of the state. This not only gave the organization countrywide
name recognition, but also demonstrated to the regime that the guerillas were not afraid of losing
their lives in the name of liberation. Secondly, this bitter defeat signaled to the rebels of a great
need to mobilize to the fullest and attempt to gain as many supporters as possible by any means
necessary.
In response to these initial losses, the black nationalist forces reassessed their strategy. In
nearby Tanzania, ZANLA combatants underwent extreme training in camps organized by
Chinese military officials. The key focus of these camps was to impart the teachings of
communist fighters operating within the Asian nation. Specifically, Mao’s stages of waging a
successful guerilla campaign were adopted: the defensive stage, calculated offensive combat, and
obtaining highly developed mobile warfare strategies (Skagen 2008:51). While in Tanzania, the
forces could train and be relatively free of hindrance from the Rhodesian government.
Many of these recruits spend over a year preparing to play their part in the war for
liberation. By and large, this new method of training became embedded within the norms and
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culture of ZANLA. With this new shift towards competence, fighters became much more
perceptive than their fellow soldiers who lost their lives in Sinoia. Now that the groups
developed and sustained bases within these foreign nations, the Rhodesian government could not
easily stifle their camps where their activities and resources were planned and delivered from.
Once this step was fully realized, the organization could then win control over rural territories
within the state itself. This however, required the organization to gain the support from this rural
populace.
Throughout the course of the conflict, the support that the nationalists received were
products of their own labor. If there were though, especially peasants within the rural areas, that
did not at first recognize the justice of the rebels cause, coercive tactics were employed to force
their backing (Kriger 1992: 104). If there were individuals within this territory that did not favor
liberation, the guerilla group would forcibly incentivize their compliance with the threat of death.
Virtually no category of person besides an actor of the state was not a target of these practices.
ZANLA and ZIPRA operatives were known to target blacks within the poor peasantry class to
well-off white farmers. They would force many of these blacks in the rural areas to stop making
their regular payments to a regime that did not have their best interests. Instead, they sought their
support. Consistently, these rebels preached to the populace that a white minority government
would never put the interest of the natives before that of the whites.
Even though the Rhodesian government was the main source of service and infrastructure
within these rural localities, the treatment they received from the state was of radically inferior
quality and quantity (Kriger 1992: 110). This type of rhetoric re-affirmed much of the anxieties
of the rural peasantry and was a motivating factor behind their decision to back the nationalist
effort. Essentially, these guerilla fighters recognized the need for their rebellion to be supported
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by as many within the territory as possible. Not only did this allow the rebellion to increase its
number of supporters and safe territories, but equally importantly, areas where Rhodesian
paramilitary personnel could not carry out administrative functions. It was commonplace for
government officials and members of the security force stationed in these rural areas to decline
due to death during battle and resignation (Kriger 1992:106). This allowed the rebel
organizations to control significant portions of the state they sought to wield authoritative power
of, a very significant step in the direction towards liberation for the native populace.
Nevertheless, there remained rural areas that were firmly under the control of the
government forces. From these administrative bases, the paramilitary troops could supply
themselves and coordinate activities. Moreover, the people living in these remote villages had
their lives regulated by the white forces. The government’s rationale behind this intrusion on the
lives of the native populace was to prevent them from being coerced to becoming supporters of
the nationalist force, as was a popular tactic employed by the rebels. Additionally, the Rhodesian
government paid close attention to these areas because they sought to keep the territory
conquered by the black forces as small as possible. Unfortunately for the government security
forces, over the course of the war for liberation, the guerillas nearly perfected their ability to
infiltrate these areas and force government paramilitary personnel to retreat. The techniques the
guerillas employed were practiced and fine-tuned; their extensive training allowed them to attack
these administrative units and be fairly certain of success.
The process that the nationalists employed to infiltrate these government-held rural bases
involved a series of well-planned steps. The first step would involve the guerillas surrounding
the base on all sides and to remain undetected by the paramilitary forces. After this, the fighters
would then search for weaknesses in the walls and fencing surrounding the village (Kriger
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1992:109). Once these weak points were identified, youth who were coopted by the nationalists
would enter the village and tell the natives who lived inside base of the attack and to escape as
soon as possible. The next radical step was the complete burning of homes within the village
which forced everyone out including the paramilitary forces. These now ‘liberated’ villages
would be coerced into supporting the guerillas and the Rhodesian officials would lose even more
territory within the state (Kriger 1992: 109). These rebels operated in such a way as to force
compliance from all groups within the territory. If there were pockets of the black citizenry that
did not assist the rebels in their efforts to overthrow the regime, they would either be forced to
join the nationalist side or painted as an actor of the state and detrimental for the goal of black
liberation.
This type of tension that materialized between the guerillas and the complicit segments
within the black populace was similar to some of the conflict that arose between ZIPRA and
ZANLA. While the guerillas accused the unsupportive blacks as a hindrance for black liberation,
ZANLA oftentimes accused ZAPU and their fighting force for being too soft and accepting of
the status quo. Ultimately, this disagreement boiled down to underlying different conceptions of
how to break from elite white minority rule. This discrepancy between the two groups resulted in
a lack of unity and sometimes even direct violence between the two groups. But soon after the
rebels both reevaluated their strategies after their earlier failures in the mid-1960’s and came
back to the fighting scene, the parties agreed to settle their differences and come together. Ten
years after the Battle of Sinoia, the ZAPU and ZANU agreed to finally unify their fighting force;
now the government would have to take on a joint coalition instead of dealing with two disparate
organizations. This new combined fighting force was known as ZIPA (Skagen 2008: 53). While
initially this appeared to be a step in the right direction for the rebel fighters, internal conflicts
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regarding organizational leadership and logistical planning made the cooperative nature of the
fighting force difficult to manage. What could have been a mutually beneficial relationship for
all the rebels, quickly devolved back to the two organizations; with ZANU growing in militancy
and effectiveness.
In the following year, tensions within ZANU leadership finally materialized in a drastic
change in power, along with the intensity with which the fighting force employed during the
armed struggle. Throughout the course of the 1970’s disagreements among these nationalist
leaders were extremely apparent and had much to do with the inadequacies of Sithole. According
to his fellow cabinet members, which included Robert Mugabe, Sithole had lacked the passion
and veracity to lead an armed struggle. In their eyes, this war for liberation needed a fierce leader
who would employ radical tactics to achieve the group’s goal of removing the authority of elitewhite minority rule within the territory. Finally, these top-officials of ZANU held a formal vote
to decide who should be the singular strong voice of their movement. Mugabe won the decision
and became the head of the organization (Skagen 2008:17).
However, all who were involved in the war for liberation did not respect this usurpation
of authority by Mugabe in 1974. Soon after this vote was made public knowledge, ZANU
affiliates operating in Mozambique heavily denounced this decision and threatened the arrest of
ZANLA fighters in the territory if Sithole was placed back into the lead role of the group. This
threat ultimately resulted in the officials agreeing to their demands. Nevertheless, the urge to
place a more authoritative and militant leader pestered among ZANU leadership. When the
opportunity struck three years later to place Mugabe into power, these officials removed Sithole
and replaced him with the young impassioned Mugabe.
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To many nationalists fighting for liberation, Mugabe epitomized many of the aggressive
and unapologetic qualities that they were looking for. This leader made it apparent that he sought
to carry out an intense armed struggle and would stop at nothing until the Rhodesian government
conceded. Many quickly latched onto his rhetoric that condemned the oppression the black
populace had been subject to, and the lack of progress made during the guerilla war so far. From
his inception as a fighter and a leader, he understood and promoted the use of violence in
government, “Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall
have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security
officer—its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins”
(Skagen 2008:21).
From this point in 1977, the route in which ZANU embarked on to effect change within
the country took on a much more violent and militaristic form. The emphasis very much so
shifted away from a relatively soft diplomatic style of Sithole who appeared agreeable to
working with Ian Smith and the Rhodesian government, to a campaign based on black power and
white fear (Skagen 2008: 42). From the ZANLA cadres on the ground to the public leaders of the
ZANU party, the focus shifted to the re-assertion of black domination over the territory that was
stolen from them when the British first entered the state. Essentially, at the heart of ZANU lied a
deep commitment to violent guerilla warfare against the state, not negotiations (Kriger 1992: 92).
Their ideology promoted the sentiment that the whites came to power as the result of their
robbery of the African land; it was the duty of this fighting force to take it back.
It is crucial to understand that the ZANLA fighters along with ZANU supporters were
convinced of the justice of their cause; they were committed to the armed struggle as much as
Mugabe was. This central tenant of ZANU along with the charisma of Mugabe attracted many
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peasants within the rural communities to support the group. Ultimately, the essence of duty and
black power resulted in an extraordinarily powerful group that the Rhodesian government was
having an increasingly difficult time suppressing. This increase in the fierceness and the militant
trajectory of ZANU rallied all liberation fighters together and greatly hindered the efforts of the
Rhodesian government. By destroying the government resource networks, military bases, and
fuel lines, it became evident that the Rhodesian government was losing the war (Chung 2006:
238).
It was obvious that the whites were losing control of the territory, while the rebels were
gaining new bases every day. From these new bases, the rebels could attack government held
areas from new, undefended points. What began as a sanctuary for white Europeans searching
for a new and exciting place to raise a family in the remoteness of Africa, became a nearly
ungovernable warzone where the natives disturbed the political and social order at nearly every
turn. The pressure from this growing ZANU force in tandem with pressure from international
actors such as the United Nations, the Rhodesian government agreed to terms for majority rule
within the territory.
In 1979, negotiations were underway between the two parties to form the Lancaster
House agreement. These talks between the liberation leadership and Rhodesian political officials
were moderated from representatives from the British parliament. During these deliberations,
rules and standards for a majority government were discussed and disputed. One of the
stipulations that Ian Smith sought to establish within the new constitution was that although he
wanted a parliament that was made up of half black natives and half white citizens, he argued for
the creation of a small coalition of around five white members who could veto any decision
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generated by the entire parliament. Therefore, whites would retain immense control within the
Zimbabwean political system (Chung 2006: 246).
While a policy such as this that kept consolidated power in the hands of a white few
would have been greeted with enthusiasm a mere decade earlier, this was no longer a
government where the whites could formally dominate the landscape. The reaction to this
assertion was favorable to black interests, as even supporters of Smith and the Rhodesian
government denounced the former prime minister’s blatant attempt to enshrine white power.
However, in the attempt to promote their interests in other terms of the negotiations, the
liberation coalition did agree to a quota system during the first seven years of independence for
at least 20% of parliamentarians to be white. What the natives did receive from the negotiations
were founding elections, the ability for the post-independence government to control the judicial
system, the nation’s police force, and have sole control over the military branches.
These massive victories for the liberation movement during negotiations stemmed from
the ability of ZANU to drastically increase the damage they brought on to Rhodesian forces
during the conflict. It was with this sketch that the new nation of Zimbabwe was established. The
elections that stemmed from the Lancaster House agreement were held during the following
February in 1980. These founding elections of the new Zimbabwe generated immense turn out as
about 90% the populace partook in the selection process for governmental leadership positions.
In the end, ZANU won the vast majority of parliamentary seats, 57 out of the available 80.
Robert Mugabe became the new leader of the country and from this point forward, he set
out to make Zimbabwe his very own, free from domination of the white-settlers. The next
endeavor was figuring out how this new nation should be administered, something that proved to
be much more difficult and nuanced than the liberation organization anticipated. What was clear
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however was that ZANU had mercilessly fought against the oppressive white order in an
extraordinarily drawn-out militant armed struggle. The fierceness that he commanded his forces
with would be the same ruthless tactics that he would employ as the leader of his newly
independent nation. In this new political landscape, although the whites still were to maintain a
political role for at least the first seven years after conflict, their and Smith’s role in the process
began eroding as Mugabe came into his own.
When the conflict ended, is symbolized the end of the European’s exotic and exciting
immigration destination. It was no longer headed by members of their own culture as the
nationalist had effectively won back their nation. For this reason, these Europeans understood
their stability and safety within the nation to be compromised. Because of this fear among the
whites, nearly half of the population left the state within three years after the Lancaster House
agreement was signed (Meredith 2009: 55). Furthermore, those whites who did decide to remain
within the territory retreated out of the political realm and kept on with their own private
interests. This mass exodus of the whites resulted in the dwindling support the white officials
received from the domestic populace (Meredith 2009: 55). Therefore, the whites who did remain
involved in politics had lost a great amount of support compared to five years earlier.
Understandably, this forced Smith and other white politicians out of politics due to their lacking
domestic mobilization as well as the strengthening power of the black nationalist leadership.
From the early 1980’s on, Mugabe and the ZANU-PF consolidated authority in the hands
of a few. One of the ways in which the leadership accomplished this end was through corrupt and
unfair national elections. This chart depicts how the electoral institutions within Zimbabwe have
regressed since the termination of hostilities in 1979:
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During the year when the Lancaster House Agreement was signed, the elections within the state
were remarkably free and fair. However, neither a wide range of parties nor people had the right
to take part in these elections. In the years since Mugabe has taken power, he has greatly cracked
down on violently on parties that seek to undermine his party and rule. The graph shows that in
2018, the electoral institutions have become much less free and fair, while not showing any
significant growth toward becoming more deliberation and participatory. The democratic
backsliding is related to the way in which ZANU was able succeed during the war for liberation.
ZANU leadership and their mobilized people throughout Zimbabwe were able to enter
the formal political fray because of their dedication to the violent armed struggle. The fact that
the organization was able to demonstrate their power and successfully defeated the Rhodesian
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forces in their own territory had profound consequences for the way in which ZANU would
employ its rule. During meetings leading up to the Lancaster House agreement, the dynamics of
the battlefield were brought into the room. This is not to say that there were violent occurrences
among the leadership at the time of negotiations, but rather that the pressures that were visible on
the state were also visible during the talks. The Rhodesian officials knew that their days of
leisure within the territory had come to an end as a result of the successful guerilla war brought
on by the black militancy. Towards the end of the conflict, ZANU forces had the ability to pick
locations within the country that was considered ‘protected’ by the Rhodesian forces, and the
cadres could un-entrench them from that particular area. Many whites had fled the country at risk
of their own homes being overrun by these nationalist forces, and the government security forces
could do little to help.
This all culminated in the government’s clear avoidance of a continuation of the
hostilities once talks began to negotiate peace had come about. This being the case, ZANU
leadership could effectively bulldoze their way through these deliberations because if the
Rhodesians appeared to be stubborn in their avocation for a specific policy, the rebels could
always leave the talks and further press on in the guerilla campaign. Based on the sheer threat
that these nationalists posed for the white regime, the negotiations were more so based on
coercion than consent. In any case, the government ultimately yielded to the emerging power and
conceded on many of its own points at risk of accruing more costs brought on by the ZANU
fighters. ZANU leadership did not have to bow to white Rhodesian interests any longer; they had
the wherewithal to win back their nation.
At the end of the talks when the black nationalists received much of their ideal outcomes,
a certain way of carrying out affairs was promoted among party leadership and their supporters.
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Through a violent armed campaign and beating their opponent into submission, ZANU and the
blacks in the population gained the ability to administer their own state. The emphasis was on
brute, not dialogue. ZANU and its fellow black nationalists did not need to truly negotiate with
the enemy, they had the ability to force their will upon them. The usefulness of their approach
was felt by nearly every level of the organization. This was a component the armed struggle that
remained with the organization for years to come and essentially planted the seeds for a system
of governance based on the use of the fist, not the olive branch.
When the party first came into power, the reputation of the party along with the charisma
and name recognition of Mugabe afforded it the boisterous approval of a large swath of
Zimbabweans (Southall 2015). Once Mugabe and his party won the nation and its support, it by
no means foresaw its giving up of that authority. One of the primary components of the ZANUPF government was the strategic use of rhetoric. Almost incessantly, the organization would
remind the populace that it was they who partook in the liberation struggle; it was them who
unshackled the chains that the elite white minority government placed on the blacks. Therefore,
any organization or anyone that challenges their claim over the territory, is treasonous. In 2002 at
a ZANU-PF rally, Mugabe stated, “Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the
white man, our real enemy” (Al Jazeera 2017). Essentially, the party used its valiance and
courage of the past, to justify its tight control over Zimbabwe in the present. This then leads into
the common party line that the organization is not just a political group within the state, but that
the party is in fact the state. With this rationale, the elites who command the governing structure
has led the nation down a long journey, resulting in the ever-consolidation of power and
authority.
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South Africa: Liberation to Democracy
The African National Congress (ANC), formerly known as the South African Native
National Congress (SANNC) was founded and embarked on its political campaign during the
first two decades of the 20th century. As an official political party of the state, it advocated for
freedoms and liberties among blacks within the territory. South African territory had a long
history of colonial exploitation. This area had its roots as part of the slave trade under the Dutch
East India country throughout the 1600’s and eventually came under British possession in the
years following (Meli 1988: xxi). Within this framework, the lives of the native black populace
paled in comparison to their white colonizers. The liberation party dedicated towards increasing
the freedoms of Africans within the territory was operating in this background.
The SANNC was communist and advocated black voting rights within the state; an ideal that
had eluded the black community due to an extensive history of colonial exploitation. Early on in
the group’s history, it employed non-violent practices as a means of achieving its goals. As an
organization, there were few attempts during its years of existence to exercise violent or even
militant strategies (Ellis & Sechaba 119:16). Throughout the first several decades of the 20th
century, the SANNC mainly denounced racist laws that unfairly discriminated against blacks in
the community as well as the workforce. Additionally during this time, the group renamed itself
to be the African National Congress (ANC). Although the group vehemently fought for black
rights, they experienced much difficulty causing change in the political landscape because of the
sheer power of the white elites.
While the South African government prior to 1948 did partake in the systematic
disenfranchisement of blacks, the situation became much worse following that year’s election.
Afrikaners who lived within the state were the mainly white descendants of earlier white
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European colonizers. In the years leading up to the election, the Afrikaners persistently
advocated their desire for a an African state of their own, “They dreamed of a lost paradise in the
shape of the independent Afrikaner republics of the nineteenth century, while building the
modern foundations of Afrikanerdom through a range of economic, cultural and labor
organizations” (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 23). It was within this context that politicians who
advocated for policies that supported this ideal were placed into office in 1948. The National
Party (NP) was brought into power through an election that was exclusively for the white
populace to partake in (although there were a select few blacks that did have voting rights). The
main mechanism that these politicians sought to utilize in order to achieve this ‘paradise’ was
that of the apartheid (separateness) system. Under this type of legislation, the entire social,
cultural, and political structure of South Africa would be dramatically altered.
Nevertheless, what the NP planned to do was not necessarily new. Earlier in South
African History, the Native Land Act of 1913 was signed into law which forced the native
populace into specific locations and eliminated their ability to partake in sharecropping practices.
Essentially the state was specifying where black Africans could live and how they could generate
a livelihood. For this reason, when the NP created a political platform enhancing this already
existing sentiment within the Afrikaner community, they were able to gain much support and
popularity. However, the NP set forth to accomplish more than merely separating the whites
from the blacks; they sought to separate blacks from each other according to tribal affinity so
they could live in their designated area (Bantustans). Through doing this, the blacks living within
the territory became markedly weaker. Additionally, the NP generated laws aimed at either
dramatically reducing, or even eliminating contact between the whites and the natives. Examples
of this ranged from laws that banned sexual relations and marriage between whites and blacks to
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the Population Registration Act of 1950. This act set the foundations for the logistics behind the
apartheid system because it required blacks to identify their particular tribal affinity: something
that was used to determine which individuals were allowed to live in specific locations.
While racist policies such as these were aimed at the suppression of black rights within
South Africa, the NP also sought to limit the parties on the political field. In 1950, the
government formally banned the Communist Party that was operating within state. While this
was a severe blow to those interests, it allowed the ANC and its members who had worked in
both parties, to concentrate their efforts in the party that was still allowed to have a part in the
political structure. In response to these oppressive policies implemented by the NP during the
early 1950’s, certain segments of the ANC began planning ways in which they could
demonstrate their discontent. During this period, the ANC organized its first mass mobilization
against the apartheid government. In 1952, the group planned for a defiance campaign that would
utilize civil disobedience as a way of protesting the racist ideals of the regime (Ellis & Sechaba
1992: 26). At this stage in the group’s development, they experimented with different ways in
which too alter the political and social landscape of the country.
One of the most foundational moments in the history of the ANC that occurred during
this time was the establishment of the Freedom Charter in 1955. In this document were the
fundamental principals that the organization sought to promote within the territory in response to
the nearly overwhelming amount of government repression over black individuals. The central
sentiments outlined that South Africa was for all people, regardless of race and that, in order to
secure that rule of the people, they sought universal suffrage. Additional rights would be that of
equal pay, freedom of the press, and access to higher education for blacks and whites alike.
However, this policy statement was not official adopted by the organization until 1956 due to
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intense debates between party officials regarding ideology. Because the Communist party had
been banned by the state, many of the communists joined the ANC to take part in the political
dialogue. This resulted in the ANC being an epicenter for debate among moderate and radical
ideals. Therefore, much consideration was needed before any formal declaration of a policy
position statement such as the Freedom Charter was published.
In any case, the movement towards protesting these unjust NP laws was becoming more
popular within the black community. The ANC was successfully organizing plans to display
black discontent through identification card burnings and work stoppages (Meli 1988: 140).
Additionally, there were officials within the black liberation movement who wanted to
accomplish the upheaval of the racist status quo in their own way. Not only was the communist
segment of the ANC members promoting their ideology, but other fractions of the organization
arose seeking to support their interests differently. One of the most notable factions of the ANC
was the Pan Afrikanist Congress (PAC), and their ideology was more assertive when it came to
fighting for black rights within South Africa (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 29). This organization felt
empowered by the growing pressure within the black populace and sought to capitalize on this
wave of support.
Wanting to separate itself from the other black-interest movements, the PAC planned an
event to demonstrate their hatred of the pass laws during the late March of 1960. This piece of
legislation required the blacks to carry identification cards so government officials could always
be able to know where that particular individual belonged and whether or not they could enter
the white areas. The PAC sponsored event entailed black Africans to go to their local police
station and protest the pass laws. Sadly in Sharpeville, the police force opened fire on the
protesting crowd resulting in the deaths of 69 individuals (Meli 1988: 140). This event was
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coined the Sharpeville Massacre by media outlets and became national and international news.
When fellow blacks within South Africa became aware of this tragic event, riots and chaos
sparked up throughout the Bantustans. The great extent of these nation-wide protests forced the
South African government to declare a state of emergency. In their effort to quiet the unrest,
about 20,000 black protesters were detained by the state. Furthermore, the mass outburst of anger
resulted in the NP becoming tired of the insurrection caused by the PAC and the ANC, and they
were both formally banned within the territory. Now that the groups were utterly pushed from
having legal political dialogue, they needed to explore new ways in which to oppose the
government.
Through much consideration among group members, the ANC developed a new radical
strategy to fight against the oppressive political order. During the following year in 1961,
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), or Spear of the Nation, was formed. This segment of the ANC was
led by Nelson Mandela and fully adopted the armed struggle as its means for affecting change in
South Africa. The goal of this organization was to cause immense destruction within the nation
as its members were instructed to burn buildings and blow up government headquarters.
Furthermore, MK cadres were advised to avoid causing civilian deaths, specifically white deaths.
Nevertheless, this was an extremely young organization and was very unexperienced early on in
its development. This being the case, the fighters were not experienced which resulted in the MK
causing many civilian casualties during the early 1960’s (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 33). Naturally,
the South African government wanted to dismantle the group and arrest the radical fighters along
with its leadership.
In regards to Mandela’s role in the group, as its leader, he sought to advance the MK’s
interests in every route possible. He was a very personable and charismatic leader who
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commanded a group that desired to strip itself of the shackles placed upon the entirety of blacks
in South Africa. Furthermore, the organization also had communist ties. These two factors
resulted in the group receiving international support from some Eastern European countries
along with China. In order to promote and solidify these connections to the outside world in
1962, Mandela left South Africa to meet these foreign officials. While he was outside of the
country, Mandela was able to act relatively freely than when he was in South Africa. When he
returned from his trip, he was forced underground and would often go through immense lengths
to disguise himself and not make his location known (Ellis & Sechabe 1992: 34).
Unfortunately for him, the South African government received a tip regarding Mandela’s
whereabouts and arrested him when the leader came upon a police roadblock (Ellis & Sechabe
1992: 34). Within the coming months, other leaders within the MK and the ANC would be
captured by actors for the state. On July 11th1963, government forces in search of the bases for
the MK and other insurrection affiliates entered the Lilliesleaf farmhouse located in Rivonia.
Here, the state officials were able to capture not only several large MK figureheads, but also
obtained incriminating documents and plans for sabotage within South Africa. The evidence
found through his raid was enough to convince the judges of the courts to lock away these rebels
for life. This largely successful crackdown on the officials within the black nationalist movement
weakened the organization. Essentially, the armed struggle at this stage was viewed as a failure
and the ANC began a roughly ten year-long period of marked absence from mass protest
(Skagen 2008: 60).
While by the end of the 1960’s the South African government was in a relatively
powerful position when compared to the nationalist group within its territory, the world outside
of the state was changing. Neighboring Rhodesia and Mozambique were heavily involved with
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the liberation movement that sought to remove the white-European government similar to that of
the South African regime. There was a great tide of changing flowing throughout Southern
Africa and the government had to be wary of the extent to which rebels within its own territory
could conquer and control land. With this change in the political climate of the region, the South
African government sought to reaffirm its grip over the populace. In 1976, another oppressive
policy was instituted that further controlled the day to day lives of blacks living in the
Bantustans. This time, the government mandated that Afrikaans (the language of the elite whites)
would be taught to the same degree in black high schools as English had been for decades.
Naturally, this upset many blacks who were now going to be forced to adopt the language of
their colonizers, “…[T]he language of their oppressors” (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 80).
While many blacks were disgruntled by this new policy, specifically the students living in
the Soweto townships were particularly angered. It was common place at the Soweto schools
during the early summer of 1976 for there to be a constant string of protest demonstrations.
When the state authorities would come to break up the protestors, the youth would throw rocks,
bottles and sticks at the uniformed officers. In accordance with their harsh responses of
Sharpeville, the police ruthlessly crackdown. On June 16th, the state officials opened fire on the
black protestors and as a result, two hundred were injured while over 20 were left dead (Ellis &
Sechaba 1992: 81).
In response to this shooting, a multitude of young protestors ran throughout the township
of Soweto, damaging stores and buildings while causing immense chaos. The local forces were
overwhelmed by these outbursts and needed assistance from larger government forces. What
began as a relatively quiet demonstration, quickly grew in to a nation-wide uprising. Blacks in
the cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg and other populous centers rose up against the repressive
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conditions. When these other parts of South Africa did protest against the corrupt actions of the
police in Soweto, they did so in a slightly more organized manner in the form of strikes.
However, again the South African forces violently retaliated against the demonstrators,
crushingly defeating them a nearly every instance. When the political climate settled down
during the following winter, the sheer devastation caused by these repeated confrontations
between black protestors and riot police were able to be calculated; nearly a thousand
demonstrators were killed while over four thousand were injured (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 82). It
is vital to understand that this was not a clash between equal forces: it was clear domination of an
oppressive regime over a much weaker group. At this point, the MK was not able to foment a
legitimate armed struggle against government forces; the people were just crushed at the will of
the state.
While the protestors through their actions could not come close to proving to be any sort
of threat to the police officers and soldiers of the South African regime, they were able to
negatively impact the status quo. This turmoil in the fallout of Soweto, along with the generally
bad image government officials’ garnered following the Sharpeville Massacre, there was reason
for foreign investors to be wary. The graphic images and videos of the outright police brutality
done unto these demonstrates was very disconcerting. Instability became the defining
characteristic of the political state which greatly worried those with interests in the mining
industry which was an essential pillar of the nation’s economy (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 82).
By its very nature, investment in the mining industry is long term. Building the mines and
taking the time to focus on digging in a particular site requires patience; it is not the type of
project that is immediately lucrative in the short term where money invested is immediately
returned. This being the case, the long-term unrest caused by the oppressive conditions brought
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on by the apartheid government placed these financial interests into a very precarious position. If
the mining industry was to suffer because of these unfair policies, it would force the rulers to
recalculate their political stances. In the years to come, the resistance movements would continue
to demonstrate their dismay and cause havoc within South Africa.
One of the more powerful and effective events committed by the MK occurred in the
early June of 1980. The group’s special forces mounted an attack on four separate sites of one of
the nation’s largest businesses simultaneously, the South African Coal, Oil and Gas
Corporation’s (SASOL) refineries and oil storage tanks (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 105). By setting
ablaze areas within the plant where oil was stored, the MK caused millions of dollars’ worth of
damage. This was by far the most successful strike committed by the organization so far and it
caused more than financial damage for the state. Not only was the populace and business owners
shaken because of their vulnerability to this attack, SASOL represented the domination of the
South African government.
The plants SASOL were created by the government in order to become more selfsufficient amid fanatical sanctions from United Nations. To curb some of the negative
consequences of these policies against the state, the South African regime sought to produce its
own fuels through the use of SASOL in an effort to avoid facing these harsh penalties. However,
during the 1970’s oil prices sky-rocketed and it became more expensive to manufacture oil
instead of importing it (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 105). This resulted in SASOL becoming largely
ineffectual and burdensome for the nation to maintain. Nevertheless, the very existence of the
SASOL represented the preservation, determination, and durability of the apartheid government.
Thus the attack by the seemingly powerless MK shocked many of government officials and
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caused them to reconsider the actual authority they wielded within the region, and if they could
realistically maintain a violence-free state.
This period of the early to mid-1980’s saw the re-emergence of the MK as a radical group
on the political playing field. Through attacks like the one on SASOL, they sought to leave their
mark wherever they could in the efforts of weakening the sanctity of the South African regime.
Nevertheless, the MK along with the ANC had a very difficult time gaining the resources and
logistical support to carry out a “People’s War”. Some of this inability stemmed from the tactics
they employed, and other inhibitors included the geographic positioning of the country An
example of one of these inhibitors was the relatively open areas within the state. When compared
to the dense bush of the Zimbabwean countryside, the landscape of South Africa was much more
traversable and visible. Essentially, this prevented the ANC and MK from operating in a hidden
and secret manner. In any case, the rebels were forced to resort to the continuation of small
sabotage-based tactics. One of these events occurred on the 20th of May 1983 when MK and
ANC cadres devised a plan to cause intense damage to government-held locations. The building
of choice was the headquarters for the South African Air Force base in Pretoria. Here, two
guerillas placed a car bomb on the street next to the building and detonated it, resulting in the
deaths of over 15 people and injuring nearly 200 others (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 127). In the end,
the attack took the lives of eleven military personnel. While this was not a large-scale attack or
battle against the regime, it did still leave a marked impact on the viewers of the event. Similarly
to what occurred following the SASOL attack, although the government did not face a real threat
from the MK cadres as the government forces could contain their advances, there was a
psychological hit that the white minority government had great difficulty tolerating. Even though
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the MK was much weaker, they still had the ability to strike at the very fundamental point of the
military establishment.
While the South African government and its forces had the ability to exercise a
dominating grip over the territory, as has been demonstrated so far, the rebel forces still were
able to impose difficulties. With this constantly nudging factor present in the political landscape,
politicians began to promote policies aimed at curbing some of the features of the state that were
grounds for resentment against the NP. P.W. Botha was elected to the position of Prime Minister
during 1978 and served until the late 1980’s. Although he was a steadfast proponent of elitewhite minority government, he did recognize that if apartheid was to last within South Africa,
the NP would have to be in a position to wield some kind of authority. In order to preserve their
authoritative handle on the nation, Botha promoted policies aimed at quelling some of the
nationalist calls. Botha recognized that, “We are moving in a changing world…We must adapt,
otherwise we shall die” (Skagen 2008: 97). With this, Botha had a specific policy
implementation in mind.
In 1984, a tricameral parliament within South Africa was introduced. This new system
would create three distinct chambers within the regime; one for whites, one for the Indians, and
one for the Coloreds. Left out in this new allotment was the native African populace. The idea
behind the NP’s implementation of this structure was to give the Coloreds and Indians ‘control’
over their own affairs. However in reality, all the decision-making power still resided in the
white house while the Africans were still disenfranchised by the system. Essentially, no real
changes besides cosmetic were made to the governing structure. Yet, I argue that even though
this was not a fundamental change in the way politics was done within the nation, it does
represent that the MK and the ANC were operating in a nation whose government was not
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diametrically opposed to change. However slight it may have been, the NP did change the
structure of the regime in response to the stimuli brought on by the nationalists.
In this same year, ANC leadership took advantage of these appearances of general
concessions and enacted one of their most fundamental policies; that of ungovernability. The
goal of this new movement was to take the highly intricate and logistic-demanding apartheid
structure and make it unworkable (Sales 1984: 2). Ungovernability as a policy was used as a
tactic to challenge early every aspect of the NP government; for the Africans in the population to
ceaselessly demonstrate their utter disapproval of the racist governing structure. Instead of
interpreting the new tricameral government as favor of the NP to the oppressed populations, the
ANC successfully framed the renovation as an attempt by the whites in power to co-opt the
Indians and the Coloreds into supporting a government that disenfranchised the native black
Africans (Sales 1984: 3). Throughout 1984 and 1985, this message took a hold on the Africans
throughout the nations. Uprising throughout the country in a plethora of townships placed the
ANC in the most potent position it had been since it declared the armed struggle in the early
1960’s (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 158). The extent of this call for reform ran deep; for it was not
just those in the populous centers who felt the need to reform, it was Africans all over. These
individuals and the ANC knew that they could not win control over their nation on the
battlefields; they had to mobilize the Africans and force them to become ungovernable so the NP
would be forced to recalibrate the profitability of their continued control.
Widespread ANC demonstrations in tandem with increased acts of MK sabotage brought
more instability in the region. In 1984, the radical group only successfully committed about 50
acts of violence. By 1986, the organization completed nearly 250 attacks on the regime (Ellis &
Sechaba 1992: 171). At this point, the South African government had felt the costs of this
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perseverant onslaught. Whites within the territory were feeling uneasy, and business interests
were nested on variable terrain; the government needed to respond definitively. In June 1986, the
South African regime declared a national state of emergency (Skagen 2008: 63). With this new
declaration, government officials were able to ruthlessly cracked down on the cadres causing
insurrection as it allowed these security forces to commit acts to benefit the state without the
worry of any legal wrangling. While this did prove to be beneficial in the months immediately
following the declaration, it by no means stopped the MK and ANC from committing acts of
sabotage in the late 1980’s. However, the state of emergency declaration did have immense
consequences for the termination of hostilities between the warring parties.
Even though there was still intense violence within South Africa during the final years of
the 1980’s a few things did become clear and apparent to both sides. One of these materializing
points was the fact that as long as there was violence in the territory, the white South African
government could never truly govern like it did at the beginning of the century: the opposition
was too dedicated and their supporters were too wide-spread. Given this emerging point, the
endless-carrying on of hostilities seemed futile. The other emerging point was that with the
declaration of the state of emergency, the government was clearly dominating the rebel forces
(Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 173). Now that state forces were nearly unbounded by legal code and had
the freedom to detain anyone they suspected to be involved in the rebel’s cause, their authority
and domination of the struggle was only that much greater. Additionally, the South African
forces had all the necessary supplies at their disposal; the nationalists were not able to interrupt
any of the government’s supply chains. When the ANC and MK leadership took a step back and
were able to fully comprehend what their status in their armed struggle was. This being the
terrain that the black nationalist saw themselves upon, a movement towards negotiating peace
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became more realistic. Rather than to continue the violence, the parties sought to lay down their
arms. It is vital to comprehend that the South African regime was no longer to fully enjoy the
benefits of governmental control because of the immense resistance among the populace.
Furthermore, the rebels were not able to uproot the NP through their brute force alone and were
bearing their own costs through continuing the armed struggle. Following the rule of P.W. Botha,
a new leader of the N.P. rose to power and sought to terminate the hostilities within South Africa
utilizing diplomacy, not the gun.
Within the first two months of the 1990’s state president F.W. de Klerk formally
unbanned the ANC and announced the release of party figure-head, Nelson Mandela. By this
time, both parties understood that there was a way to plan a mutually beneficial future. Through
the diplomatic process of negotiation, both sides sat and understood what the other needed in the
new formulation of South African rule. At the inception of these talks, the parties involved
agreed to the peaceful process. During the period from 1990-1993, party officials organized with
one another and heard each other. Because of the ANC and MK’s relatively weak stature when
compared to that of the government forces, they needed to focus on making changes through this
forum; they could not go back to the battlefield that proved unfruitful during their nearly 30 year
struggle. During the course of these extensive sit-downs, there was pressure on all sides to
formulate a peaceful settlement as no group truly sought a return to violence.
In the end, all the parties were able to find mutually acceptable terms. In the ‘interim’
constitution of 1993, was the conception for majority rule within South Africa. With the
elections set for the following year in 1994, the ANC would finally have the chance to compete
for authority via the ballot box to take part in a government that head a set separation of powers,
a judicial branch that could not be influenced by external pressure, a Bill of Rights, along with
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many other foundational systems that would ensure a democratic nation (Southall 2015). In
addition, a proportional representation system was instituted to ensure the widest variety of
opinion would be able to make its way into the formal political dialogue. Ultimately, the ANC
was able to prove its wide-spread support in the 1994 elections, winning about 63% of the
national vote and Mandela was elected as the new President of South Africa.
In 1993, the great diplomatic efforts made by the leadership of the NP and the ANC were
awarded. Mandela and de Klerk were both selected to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for their
instrumental orchestration to bring about the terms to end apartheid rule (Nobel Media 2019).
This recognition from the international community further promoted the incentives for these two
parties to work with one another as it became quiet apparent that the world was closely watching.
From this point on, the administration as well as much of the native black populace
understood the value of their approach to altering the political landscape. Although the ANC
could not force the South African government into submission by sheer will, they could impose
costly conditions for the white officials to deal with. At this moment in the conflict, the
government had been putting up with a pestilence for nearly 30 years, and it was in the interest
of both to put the hostilities to an end. In order to accomplish this ideal state of the nation, groups
of all different political positioning and interests needed to come together and hash out a plan for
how the future of the country would be framed. In this context where the voices of the
government officials, along with the long disenfranchised African organizations could be heard,
respected, and meaningfully understood. The result of these long and enduring negotiations was
that the ANC, the NP, and the rest of the black-interest organizations set the foundation for the
future constitution.
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In the new political landscape, the leading parties and officials began to work with one
another in order to promote their own policies. The only way in which to accomplish this end
was if the organizations could take part in the electoral process and have meaningful dialogue
once the organizations became formal political authorities. For this reason, I find the
development of this particular institution to be extremely relevant for democratic consolidation.
The graph below depicts the growth of the South African electoral process:

In 1994, South Africa had relatively developed electoral institutions as they could be generalized
as generally free and fair, deliberative, and participatory. Since the end of the conflict in 1994,
the new government has only progressed and developed the electoral institution further. This not
only signifies a democratic consolidation, but also that the parties involved obey the law of the
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land. Merely because one organization might hold a majority, does not mean that they will usurp
the rules. This reverence for the law has allowed the differing factions of the political sector to
grow within one another in a gradually democratizing nation. The rationale behind this
development lies in the way the war for liberation terminated.
Because of these negotiations, the ANC was successfully able to transition from a
banned-political organization, to the dominating party of the state. The manner in which this
came about is fundamental for how members of the group and their constituents view the
political process. The ideal outcomes for these people were black majority rule over the South
African territory and they accomplished this via talk with the formal governing structure, even in
light of how corrupt and oppressive the regime had been in the decades leading up to the
negotiations. The ANC understood its inferior role in the process and saw the value in a
meaningful dialogue. Because this very democratic approach was essentially the reason why the
organization was able to enter the formal political fray, members and their supporters realized
their ideal outcomes through this route. Instead of bulldozing their way into state offices, they
first had to talk with and concede to another party; this in turn creates a democratic culture
within the liberation organization; for their reliance to achieve power was one of collaboration
rather than consolidation. This sentiment is what the ANC officials and their constituents sought
to maintain in their new nation.

Liberation to Nation: Cadres to Commanders
The wars for liberation in South Africa and Zimbabwe embodied much of the same
qualities, but differed in one specific characteristic: the relative distribution of power between the
nationalist fighters and the settler regime. In the case of the Rhodesian government and
ZANU/ZAPU, the rebel forces were able to uproot security forces from their military bases
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towards the end of the armed struggle. However in the case of the ANC/MK and the South
African Defense Force, the rebels never truly had a real chance at posing a legitimate threat to
the state. These dynamics do not alone explain why South Africa had become democratic and
why Zimbabwe has fallen into deep-seated authoritarian rule, but there are characteristics of each
of their fights that had a marked impact on democratic consolidation within the states.
Because ZANU posed an extensive threat to the Rhodesian government and was the
cause of immense turmoil within the nation, they were able to manipulate the state in ways that
the ANC simply could not. This drastic demarcation between the two movements becomes
evident during the final stages of each conflict. ZANU had the ability to aggressively push its
own agenda during the talks leading up to the Lancaster House agreement. If the Rhodesian
government did indicate that would not agree to a specific term laid out by the rebels, the cadres
always had the option of going back to the battlefield and settling the matter there where they
knew the regime’s soldiers did not have the ability to stop them. Contrastingly, it was a quite
difficult journey for the ANC to even get the South African government to the negotiating table,
much less accept the totality of their terms for the new constitution. The ANC had relentlessly
try to impose costs on maintaining the governing structure any way it could as a means to have
the government even consider altering their policies. Once the formal state was convinced that
they could benefit from the termination of hostilities, the ANC did not have the bulldozing power
that was afforded to ZANU. Therefore, they needed to utilize diplomacy and cooperative
negotiating skills to conceive of a mutually beneficial constitution with the NP.
The extent of this variation between the ANC and ZANU is evidenced by the sheer time
it took each to convince the formal state to sit down and discuss nation-wide reforms. While the
guerilla campaign in Rhodesia lasted from the first attacks at the battle of Sinoia in 1966 to the
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signing of the Lancaster House agreement which terminated the hostilities in 1979, the armed
struggle in South Africa began in 1961 and did not come to an end until terms between the black
nationalists and the NP were signed in 1989. The war for liberation in Rhodesia only lasted
eleven years compared to the nearly twenty-eight long years. The ZANU/ZAPU forces were able
to cause relatively immediate and shocking damage to the Rhodesian governing structure rather
quickly. What was a fairly embedded regime just a mere decade earlier was upheaved by the
black rebels. However in the case of the ANC, it took almost thirty years to just nudge the
government over the edge to allow for negotiations to occur. This required the group to move
towards the traditional democratic party formulation and cooperate with other interests. The
opposite was true of ZANU who largely relied on its mere violence and brute to promote its own
agenda unto the Rhodesian government.
What these organizations were able to do at the end of their armed struggles was dictated
by the relative power dynamic between them and the state they sought to reform. While ZANU
had the strength, the ANC had the more advanced democratic sentiment within its party. When
Mugabe depended on the clout of his fighting force, Mandela and other ANC officials had to
negotiate on the South African government’s terms. These two radically different circumstances
surrounding the leaders of the liberation movements in South Africa and Rhodesia greatly
influenced the expectations and norms for political dealings among the group’s leading actors.
Some grew accustomed to the use of blatant force to achieve their ideal outcomes, others had to
develop democratic means of achieving their ideal ends. While the relative power dynamic
difference between the ANC and ZANU has great implications for what that party will do once it
is in a formal position of power, it is only one attribute of their armed struggle. This is not the
singular reason why Zimbabwe and South Africa have gone down extraordinary different routes
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as there are a multitude of other factors at play, but it does warrant further examination. The
table below summarizes the results of the study:
Nation Power Dynamic

Institutional
Development
South Africa Relatively unequal power Democratic
dynamic
consolidation

Zimbabwe Relatively equal power
dynamic

Lack of democratic
consolidation

Rationale
Liberation movement will not be
able to manipulate the government
through the use of force and will
have to use democratic methods to
affect change within the state and
will continue to use these tactics as
an institutionalized political party
Liberation movement will be able
to manipulate the regime through
the use of force and will continue
to use those methods to affect
change within the state as an
institutionalized political party
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The relative power dynamic between the liberation movement and the regime during the
conflict has great implications for that nation’s prospects for democratic consolidation. When a
rebel organization is markedly weaker than the government, the emerging party will be forced to
adopt democratic practices if it is to enter the formal political fray. However, if the liberation
group has relatively equal power to that of the government, the rebels will be able to manipulate
the government in ways it simply could not if it was weaker. Therefore, the organization that has
this relative strength will be able to force negotiations with the state, and dominate them once the
parties sit down to find a solution.

Adding to the Literature
The findings of this research project add to the relevant literature in a few distinct ways.
By analyzing these two cases, several factors of democratization mentioned in the literature
review section come into vision. Firstly, the arguments articulated by Geddes (1999) concerning
a regime’s ability to maintain authority over a state are applicable. In Zimbabwe is where Robert
Mugabe and the ZANU-PF party commanded over the region and have kept others from
intruding on its political power. Their capacity to continue their rule over the territory for many
decades stems from their ability to reward certain influential individuals with bribes and
payments in exchange for their loyalty. Even though the ZANU-PF governing structure does not
provide rights and liberties to the entirety of the populace, until very recently the government
was stable because of their capability of providing for certain individuals.
Another application of a component from the literature that was present in the cases was
the findings of Bratton & van de Walle (1997) conception of civil society. These researchers
found that domestic pressures stemming from the people can be the great ignitor that causes
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political reform. In both South African and Zimbabwe, the black populace rallied together under
immense oppression and consistently voiced their disapproval with the racist governing
structure. In spite of the persistent weight from the settler regime consistently pushing down
upon them, civil society found a way to generate political reform.
Additionally, the findings of this research are a case application of Acosta (2014) that
assert that the attitudes, experiences, and preferences of the constituent base of a liberation
movement has a significant impact on the types of tactics that organization will employ.
Furthermore, he finds that what these liberation groups were able to accomplish during their
movement is highly indicative of what the organization will do once it becomes an
institutionalized political party. These findings are directly demonstrated by the stories of the
ANC and ZANU organizations. What these organizations were able to complete during their
distinct wars for liberation influenced the culture and decision making process of the party
leadership and their constituency. Essentially, what these groups were able to achieve using
specific tactics informed what routes for promoting change were fruitful. It is these preferences
that shaped how the group would act once it entered the formal political process. For example,
ZANU achieved the totality of its ideal outcomes using force and violence, therefore, the group
utilized those tactics as a party. In the case of the ANC, they achieved their ideal outcomes
through the democratic process; this type of peaceful and diplomatic method stayed with the
organization when it became the legitimate wielder of authority in South Africa.

Limitations
This research project investigates how relative power dynamics between a liberation
movement and the state influence whether or not a nations is likely to democratize after a war
for liberation. While I attempted to account for all the relevant factors and analyze all the
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relevant literature, there are to be sure some limitations of the study. One of these shortcomings
being that I only analyze two cases: South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Another limitation of my research is the fact that I analyze the discrepancy between these
two cases based on a singular variable: the relative power dynamic between movement and
regime. While I believe that this was the major difference of the cases and had a great effect on
where these two nations are today, there are other variables that the nations do not share. One of
these factors being that South African state prior to liberation employed the apartheid system.
The white regime sought to keep the blacks wholly separated from the whites. In this state, it was
made clear that the blacks would be devoid of any political authority. However in Rhodesia,
while the whites there still dominated political action, blacks were not totally removed from the
political system. Instead, Rhodesian leaders were openly in the process of testing if blacks and
whites could work with one another; the plan all along was to determine if these two races could
work together. This was remarkably more progressive than what the blacks living in South
Africa were exposed to. There is a chance that this difference in the way blacks were treated
could account for their divergent outcomes during and after the war for liberation.
It is vital to understand that I am not asserting that the difference in the relative power
dynamic between the movement and the state is the sole reason why South Africa and Zimbabwe
have gone down their distinctive paths. However, I do believe that it is an important component
of their wars for liberation and had a marked impact on their organization’s culture and method’s
for achieving ideal outcomes. For this reason, future research should take these power dynamics
into consideration when analyzing how liberation movements, turned institutionalized political
parties, foster democratic consolidation. This relationship between the two actors will be
cemented by the war between them. The costs of the conflict and how the movement can
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manipulate the state are factors that determine what the group will need to accomplish if it is to
enter the formal political fray. These necessitated activities will then motivate either democratic
progression, or authoritarian regression.
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